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Abstract
In this paper, we show synchronization for a group of output passive agents that communicate with
each other according to an underlying communication graph to achieve a common goal. We propose
a distributed event-triggered control framework that will guarantee synchronization and considerably
decrease the required communication load on the band-limited network. We define a general Byzantine
attack on the event-triggered multi-agent network system and characterize its negative effects on syn-
chronization. The Byzantine agents are capable of intelligently falsifying their data and manipulating the
underlying communication graph by altering their respective control feedback weights. We introduce a
decentralized detection framework and analyze its steady-state and transient performances. We propose
a way of identifying individual Byzantine neighbors and a learning-based method of estimating the
attack parameters. Lastly, we propose learning-based control approaches to mitigate the negative effects
of the adversarial attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed coordination of multi-agent systems has been discussed extensively in control,
communication and computer science literature. The wide range of applications in this area
includes multiple robot coordination [1], cooperative control of vehicle formations [2], flocking
[3] and spacecraft formation flying [4]. A strong body of literature exists on the state syn-
chronization of homogeneous multi-agent systems with identical dynamics. In many practical
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2applications of multi-agent systems, however, individual systems may have different dynamics
with different state-space dimensions. This has instigated the need for the design of output-
based control frameworks which do not require the full knowledge of dynamic states and the
focus on synchronization of multi-agent systems with different dynamics based on their output
information. The problem of synchronization naturally arises when a group of networked agents
are seeking output-based agreement according to a certain quantity of interest that depends on
the overall goal of the multi-agent system. More specifically, synchronization for a multi-agent
system is defined as the agents following a desired output behavior that is achieved thorough
local cooperation of neighboring agents. This cooperation is based on a feedback mechanism
consisting of a weighted sum of the differences of the outputs of the neighboring agents. Some
examples of systems under cooperative control resulting in sophisticated dynamic patterns which
cannot be achieved by individual members are migration (or flocking), swarming, and torus.
There exists a large body of valuable works in the area of synchronization and control. The
problem of synchronization for multi-agent systems with dynamic communication edges has
been explored in [5]. Adaptive synchronization of diffusively coupled systems is discussed in
[6]. Synchronization of multi-agent systems that are physically coupled is discussed in [7].
Another interesting sub-field of synchronization in multi-agent system consists of leader-follower
synchronization problems, such works include [5], [8]–[10]. The relationship amongst dissipa-
tivity, passivity and output synchronization has been explored in the literature as well [11]–[13].
Synchronization under switching topologies is discussed in [14]. Cluster-based synchronization
in which only the synchronizations of separate clusters are achieved is discussed in [15]. Some
of the other recent notable works in the area of synchronization in multi-agent systems are given
in [16]–[24].
In none of the works above, the problem of security and the negative effects of malicious
attacks on synchronization have been discussed. In this work, we consider the effects of a
Byzantine attack on the multi-agent network. Byzantine attacks were first proposed by [25] and
may cover different types of malicious behaviors [26]. In our work, Byzantine agents intelligently
falsify their data —Similar to the adversaries defined in [27]–[29]. The Byzantine agents are
assumed to be powerful in the sense that they have the complete knowledge of the whole
system and can update their information in an arbitrary way and send different data to distinct
neighbors at the same time. Additionally, the Byzantine nodes are capable of disturbing the
structure of the underlying communication graph by manipulating their feedback weights —The
3communication graph is usually required to meet certain conditions for synchronization to happen
[11]–[13]. Lastly, we propose a distributed method of detection and mitigation as opposed to
the more common centralized methods where a fusion center takes upon itself the responsibility
of detecting and mitigating the attacks. There is obviously always a limitation to this approach
as the central fusion unit may be compromised as well. Our proposed distributed detection and
mitigation framework will eliminate this possibility. In the consensus literature, the decentralized
method of detection has been proposed in works such as [30]–[33]. In [33] for example, it is
assumed that through collaboration, the Byzantine agents are aware of the true hypothesis, which
is similar to the assumption we make in the present work. As another example, in [32], the authors
rely on a sequential decentralize probability ratio test that is modified via a reputation-based
mechanism in order to filter out the false data and only accept reliable messages. Lastly, most
detection and mitigation frameworks in the literature rely on exclusion of Byzantine agents from
the synchronization algorithm [34], [35]. For example, in [36], the authors propose an adaptive
outlier detection framework, based on which, the outside of the bound received information
are excluded from the consensus process. In our work, we propose a mitigation scheme that
takes advantage of the falsified information received from the Byzantine agents and mitigates
the effects of the attack without excluding the Byzantine neighbors. This is due to the fact
that excluding the Byzantine agents usually is not the best practice as most synchronization
algorithms [11]–[13], rely on balancedness and connectedness of the underlying communication
graph and exclusion of Byzantine agents may contradict these conditions.
Our framework is based on each individual agent locally deciding, based on its local test
statistics that contain the information received by the agent from its neighbors, whether the
entire multi-agent system has reached synchronization. We also show synchronization for an
event-triggered control framework. This is motivated by the fact that event-triggered control
frameworks can considerably reduce communication and computation load on the band-limited
communication network [37]. Additionally, it has been shown that event-based control methods
can maintain the same performance index as their continuous and periodic based control counter-
parts [38], [39]. First, we show that, under no attack, the entire event-triggered multi-agent
network system is capable of reaching synchronization and that each agent may decide correctly
on synchronization based on their local summary statistics, if our proposed triggering-based
control framework and the underlying communication graph meet certain conditions. Next,
we propose a method of identifying Byzantine agents based on the statistical distribution of
4Byzantine agents’ outputs. We characterize and analyze the performance of the detection unit.
Lastly, we propose a method of mitigation for the attacks in order to maintain the synchronization
of the entire event-triggered multi-agent network system. In this vein, the contributions of our
work are listed below,
• We show synchronization for an event-triggered multi-agent network system with output
passive agents. We introduce a local decision making process based on which each individual
agent decides whether the entire system has reached synchronization or not.
• We propose a simple design-oriented event-triggering control framework based on simple
output-based triggering conditions which guarantees synchronization and positive lower-
bounds for the inner-event time-instances (lack of Zeno behavior).
• We define a rather general Byzantine attack framework, and characterize the effects of the
attack on passive qualities of the multi-agent system in particular and synchronization of
the entire system in general.
• We introduce a decentralized detection framework for detecting the Byzantine attack.
• We analyze the performance of the proposed detection framework. We characterize both
the steady-state and transient performance of the detection framework.
• We propose a specific method of identifying individual Byzantine neighbors and learning
their attack parameters.
• Lastly, we introduce two different learning-based mitigation processes; one based on the
passive properties of the agents, and one based on the statistical distribution of the data
received from the neighboring agents. Based on which, we propose a learning-based control
framework that can considerably mitigate the negative effects of the attack.
II. MATHEMATICAL AND STATISTICAL PRELIMINARIES
Consider the dynamical system G,
G :
x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t))y(t) = h(x(t), u(t)),
where f and h are Lipschitz functions, x(t) ∈ X ⊂ Rn, and u(t) ∈ U ⊂ Rm, and y(t) ∈ Y ⊂ Rm
are respectively the state, input and output of the system, and X , U and Y are the state, input
and output spaces.
5Definition 1. ([40]) The supply rate ω(u(t), y(t)) is a well-defined supply rate, if for all t0, t1
where t1 ≥ t0, and all solutions x(t) ∈ X , u(t) ∈ U , and y(t) ∈ Y of the dynamical system, we
have, ∫ t1
t0
|ω(u(t), y(t))|dt <∞.
Dissipativity and passivity are energy-based notions that characterize a dynamical system by
its input/output behavior. A system is dissipative if the change in the system’s stored energy
is upper-bounded by the energy supplied to the system. The energy supplied to the system
is mathematically modeled by the supply function, and the energy stored in the system is
mathematically modeled by the storage function.
Definition 2. ([40]) System G is dissipative with respect to the well-defined supply rate ω(u(t), y(t)),
if there exists a nonnegative storage function V (x) : X → R+ such that for all t0, t1 where
t1 ≥ t0, and all solutions x(t) ∈ X , u(t) ∈ U , and y(t) ∈ Y of the dynamical system,
V (t1)− V (t0) ≤
∫ t1
t0
ω(u(t), y(t))dt,
is satisfied. If the storage function is differentiable, we have,
V˙ (t) ≤ ω(u(t), y(t)), ∀t ≥ 0.
Definition 3. ([41]) As a special case of dissipativity, system G is called passive, if there exists
a nonnegative storage function V (x) : X → R+ such that,
V (t1)− V (t0) ≤
∫ t1
t0
uT (t)y(t)dt
is satisfied for all t0, t1 where t1 ≥ t0, and all solutions x(t) ∈ X , u(t) ∈ U , and y(t) ∈ Y of
the dynamical system.
Definition 4. ([42]) System G is considered to be Output Feedback Passive (OFP), if it is
dissipative with respect to the well-defined supply rate,
ω(u, y) = uTy − ρyTy,
for some ρ ∈ R. Additionally, if the storage function is differentiable, we may have,
V˙ (t) ≤ uTy − ρyTy.
6The above definition presents a more general form for the concept of passivity. Based on
Definition 4, we can denote an output passive system based on its output passivity index. If
ρ < 0 then the system has a shortage of passivity. A positive value for the passivity index ρ
indicates an excess in passivity. If ρ > 0, then the system is called output strictly passive (OSP).
Definition 5. ([42]) System G is called finite-gain L2-stable, if for the smallest possible positive
gain γ, and ∀u(t) ∈ U , a β exists such that over the time interval [0, τ ] and for any positive τ ,
we have,
||yτ ||L2 ≤ γ||uτ ||L2 + β.
Here, ||yτ ||L2 and ||uτ ||L2 represent the L2-norm of truncated signals over the time interval
[0, τ ]. For instance,
||yτ ||L2 =
√∫ τ
0
yT (t)y(t)dt.
In probability theory, the expected value (E[X]) of a random variable X , intuitively, is the
long-run average value of repetitions of the experiment it represents, in the continuous sense,
this is defined as,
E[X] =
∫ +∞
−∞
xfPDF (x)dx.
The notation fPDF (.) represents the probability density function (PDF) of a distribution. Expec-
tation of the random variable X conditioned on the hypothesis (or random distribution) H is rep-
resented as E[X|H]. The complementary distribution function of the standard normal Gaussian
distribution with zero mean (µ = 0) and standard deviation σ = 1 is denoted as Q(z) =
∫∞
z e
−t2
2 dt√
2pi
.
The Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2 is denoted as φ(x|µ, σ2) = e
−(x−µ)2
2σ2
σ
√
2pi
. Null
and alternative hypotheses are represented as H0 and H1. Probability of an event is represented as
P . Probability of false alarm (type 1 error) or accepting the alternative hypothesis and rejecting
the null hypothesis mistakenly is shown as PFA = Pr(D = H1|H0) and probability of detection
is PD = Pr(D = H1|H1).
III. THE COMMUNICATION GRAPH MODEL
The communication flow between agents may be represented as a weighted directed graph
[43]. A graph is directed, if its edges have direction. We consider a finite positively weighted
7Fig. 1. Graph - An Example.
directed graph G := (V,E) with no loops and with the adjacency matrix A, where the entry
ai,j 6= 0, if there is a directed edge from vertex i to vertex j, otherwise ai,j = 0. The adjacency
matrix A represents both the link weights and the topology of the graph. V is the vertex set
including all vertices (all N agents), V = {1, 2, ..., N}. E is the edge set including all edges
(communication links), E ⊂ V ×V . The agent Gi can send information to agent Gj , if (i, j) ∈ E
and ai,j 6= 0. The in-degree of a vertex j is given by din(j) =
∑
j akj and the out-degree
of a vertex j is given by dout(j) =
∑
j ajk where k respectively represents the in-neighbor
(Vin(j) = {k ∈ Vin(j)|(k, j) ∈ E}) and out-neighbor (Vout(j) = {k ∈ Vout(j)|(j, k) ∈ E})
agents that have a communication link in common with agent j. We introduce the diagonal
degree matrix DN×N with dj,j = dout(j),∀j ∈ V . The weighted Laplacian matrix L of the
graph is defined as L = D − A. For the graph presented in Fig. 1, we have,
A =

0 1 1 0 0
0 0 2 0 1
0 0 0 0 3
0 1 0 0 0
2 1 0 1 0

, D =

2 0 0 0 0
0 3 0 0 0
0 0 3 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 4

, L =

2 −1 −1 0 0
0 3 −2 0 −1
0 0 3 0 −3
0 −1 0 1 0
−2 −1 0 −1 4

.
Definition 6. [43] A vertex is balanced, if its in-degree is equal to its out-degree. A directed
wighted graph is balanced, if all of its vertices are balanced.
It is important to note that the followings hold for a balanced directed graph, 1TNL = 0 and
LT1N = 0, where 1N = [1, ..., 1]T is a vector of size N . The graph presented in Fig. 1 is
balanced.
8Definition 7. [43] A path of length r in a directed graph is a sequence of r+ 1 distinct vertices
{v0, v1, ..., vr} such that for every i ∈ {0, ..., r + 1}, (vi, vi+1) is an edge. A weak path is a
sequence of r + 1 distinct vertices {v0, v1, ..., vr} such that for every i ∈ {0, ..., r + 1}, either
(vi, vi+1) or (vi+1, vi) is an edge. A directed graph is weakly connected if any two vertices can
be joined by a weak path.
Definition 8. [43] A directed graph is connected, if for any pair of distinct vertices vi and vj ,
there is a weak path from vi to vj . A directed graph is strongly connected, if for any pair of
distinct vertices vi and vj , there is a directed path from vi to vj .
The connectivity measures of directed graphs are related to the algebraic properties of their
Laplacian matrices [44].
Definition 9. [44] For a directed graph G with the Laplacian matrix L, the algebraic connectivity
is a real number defined as
λ(G) := minz∈P zTLz,
where P = {z ∈ RN : z⊥1N , ||z|| = 1}.
For a balanced connected graph G with nonnegative weights and Laplacian matrix L, we
have λ(G) = γ2(L+L
T
2
) > 0, where γ2 is the second smallest eigenvalue of the matrix L+L
T
2
(γ1 = 0) [44]. Lastly, we define N inj and N outj . N inj denotes the set of all neighboring nodes that
send information to agent Gj including the weights associates with their communication graph
topology. N outj denotes the set of all neighboring nodes that receive information from agent Gj
including the weights associates with their communication graph topology. For a balanced graph,
the cardinality of these two are equal |N outj | = |N inj |. For instance, for the graph presented in
Fig. 1, we have: N in5 = {1G2, 3G3} and |N in5 | = |N out5 | = 4.
IV. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider the problem of synchronization for a multi-agent system consisting of N agents
under an event-triggered network control framework. We assume that agents are output passive,
V˙j(t) ≤ uTj (t)yj(t)− ρjyTj (t)yj(t), ∀t > 0 for j = 1, ...N.
We consider an efficient event-based framework where agents communicate with each other
only when necessary. In other words, agent Gj sends new information to its neighboring agents
9when the last information sent to other agents is outdated and requires a new modification based
on Gj’s current dynamics and the event-triggering condition. This considerably decreases the
communication load on the shared network. Consequently, it is assumed that the agents that
will receive the new information from Gj will update their control inputs accordingly. Each
agent establishes a new communication attempt with its neighboring agents over a band-limited
networks when its triggering condition is met. The triggering conditions are output-based and
simple to design,
||ej(t)||22 > δj||yj(t)||22. (1)
The event-detector is located on the output of each agent to monitor the behavior of its output.
An updated measure of yj is sent to the communication network when the error between the last
information sent (ytk)) and the current one, ej(t) = yj(t)− yj(tk) (for t ∈ [tk, tk+1)) exceeds a
predetermined threshold established by the designer based on the relation given in Eq. 1 and the
design parameter δj . At instances for which the triggering condition is met, and new information
is successfully exchanged and the error is set back to zero, ej(tk+1) = 0. These simple triggering
conditions will facilitate the design process by making it easier for the designer to understand
and analyze the trade-offs amongst synchronization, performance and communication load. Each
agent has its own respective sampler condition which is designed based on its passivity properties
and its location in the underlying communication graph. This will be analytically presented in
Section VII. Theorem 1 outlines the design condition for each δj . The control input for each
agent is represented by the summation of the differences between the agent’s output and the
output of its neighboring agents multiplied by respective positive control gains,
uj =
∑
k∈N inj
ak(yk(t
n
k)− yj(tnj )). (2)
More specifically, the input uj for agent Gj consists of the summation of ak(yk(tnk) − yj(tnj )),
where yj(tnj ) represents agent Gj’s last output sent to its neighbors, and yk(t
n
k) represents the
last received output from the neighboring agent k where k ∈ N inj . ak > 0 represents a control
gain established by agent Gj for each neighboring agent,ak if agent Gj receives information from agent Gk0 otherwise.
One can represent the underlying communication graph according to Section III, in which
case the control gains ak represent the arc weights in the graph. The assumption made here
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is that during the initialization and design of the gains and communication links for the entire
multi-agent, the underlying communication graph is connected and balanced. We denote the
outputs of N agents by the vector Y = [y1, y2, ..., yN ]T . We define the matrix Φ ∈ R(N−1)×N as
follows,
Φ =

−1 + (N − 1)ν 1− ν −ν ... −ν
−1 + (N − 1)ν −ν 1− ν . . . ...
...
... . . . . . . −ν
−1 + (N − 1)ν −ν ... −ν 1− ν
 (3)
where ν = N−
√
N
N(N−1) ∈ R. Matrix Φ exhibits the following properties: Φ1N = 0, ΦΦT = IN−1,
and,
ΦTΦ =

N−1
N
−1
N
... −1
N
−1
N
N−1
N
. . . ...
... . . . . . . −1
N
−1
N
... −1
N
N−1
N
 = IN −
1
N
1N1
T
N .
To measure synchronization mathematically, we define,
Y¯ =
1
N
1TNY =
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi, (4)
and,
Y∆ = (y1 − Y¯ , y2 − Y¯ , ..., yN − Y¯ )T . (5)
Y∆ represents a measure for synchronization of agents. Y∆ = 0 only happens when all agents
reach the same synchronized state y1 = y2 = ... = yN = Y¯ . We have ΦTΦY = (IN −
1
N
1N1
T
N)Y = Y∆. Further,
Y TΦTΦΦTΦY = Y T∆ Y∆. (6)
Lastly, we can show that,
Y TLTY = (Y∆ +
1
N
1N1
T
NY )L
TY
= Y∆L
TY = Y∆L
T (Y∆ +
1
N
1N1
T
NY )
= Y T∆L
TY∆ ≥ λ(G)Y TΦTΦY = λ(G)Y TY − λ(G)
N
Y T1N1NY, (7)
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where λ(G) represents the algebraic connectivity of the underlying communication graph and L
is the Laplacian matrix. In Section VII, we represent the results for synchronization of the entire
event-triggered multi-agent system and the design conditions for each event-detector based on
the passivity properties of agents and algebraic properties of the communication graph.
V. SENSING, DETECTION AND FUSION FRAMEWORKS
The three most popular signal detection approaches for spectrum sensing are matched filtering
detection method, feature detection method, and energy detection method [26]. Here, we adopt
an energy-based detection approach for the detection center on each agent [45], [46]. The
energy detector measures the energy in the input wave over a specific time interval. This means
that our framework is based on detecting a deterministic signal over a noisy communication
channel. The energy detection method, however, cannot differentiate between noise and signal,
but at the same time does not need any prior knowledge about the signal’s distribution. It is
assumed that the detection center makes decisions under a Neyman-Pearson (NP) set-up, and
that the adversary is aware of it [47]. The local summary statistic of each agent is calculated
from the received signal energy from the neighboring agents. As mentioned, at each triggering
instance, each agent communicates with its neighbors. In our detection framework, this means
that each communication attempt will update the summary statistic of neighboring agents. This
process continues until the whole multi-agent system synchronizes to a steady-state. This steady-
state represents the global test statistic at which the entire multi-agent system has reached
synchronization. At each updating instance, each agent makes a decision whether the entire
system has reached synchronization or not. As later defined, this process also decides if a
neighboring agent is Byzantine or not. In order to fulfill the premise behind this framework,
each agent is equipped with a detection unit that has access to the network topology in order to
gain information [46]. We explain this in more details in this section.
The signals received by each agent’s detection unit are assumed to be unknown in details but
deterministic. The band-limited communication environment in which signals travel is known.
The noise is assumed to be Gaussian and additive with zero mean. Based on the assumption of
a deterministic signal, we know that the input with signal present is Gaussian with a nonzero
mean. For agent Gj , at time instant τ , the sensed signal received from the neighboring agent
12
Gk, yτk is given as,
yτk =
n
τ
k under H0
h˜ks
τ + nτk under H1,
where h˜k represents the channel gain and nnk represents the noise for the communication link
from agent Gk to agent Gj (H1 and H0 here represent the hypotheses under which, the signal is
present or not). The channel gain in the communication link between each two agents, models the
effects of channel shadowing, channel loss and fading. nτk is additive Gaussian noise with zero
mean and variance σ2k (N (0, σ2k)). It is assumed that the noise nτk and signal sτk are statistically
independent. The channel gains h˜k and noise variances σ2k for channels are readily available
for each agent. These assumptions are justified by the fact that each detection unit can perform
simple noise power estimation and channel gain estimation (by averaging the signal-to-noise
ratio over a certain time interval) between consecutive sensing intervals to accurately obtain
these values [48]. Additionally, we assume that h˜k is considered larger than the estimate value
to compensate for any overhead [48].
It has been shown that control gain designs that compensate for the negative effects of the
communication channel h˜k comparatively perform better [49]. As a result, one can design the
optimal control gains ak (explained in details in Section IV) according to ak = Kkh˜k to compensate
for channel effects. This is not a necessary rule to follow for the results presented in this paper.
This weight design, however, will efficiently assign higher weights to channels with higher
Signal-to-Noise ratio (more confidence in the received data) and vice-versa [49]. Lastly, the
channel gains are assumed independent of each other, known and constant over each sensing
period. This is justified by the slow-changing nature of the communication links where the delay
requirement is short compared to the channel coherence time [50]. Each agent Gj calculates a
local summary statistic Tk over a detection interval of L samples, from the information received
from its neighboring agent Gk,
Tk =
L∑
i=1
|yik − yij|2. (8)
It can be assumed that L = 2TW where TW is an integer representing the time-bandwidth
product of the energy detector with T standing for the effective spectrum sensing time-interval
and W standing for the bandwidth of the sensing spectrum [51]. yij represents the last output
sent from agent Gj to its neighboring agents at instance i, which is also utilized in calculating
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the local summary statistic Tk over the detection interval of L. The energy in a finite number of
samples for the local summary statistic can be approximated by the sum of squares of statistically
independent Gaussian random variables having certain means (|yik − yij|) and equal variances.
This sum has a Chi-Square distribution with L degrees of freedom (X 2L) in the absence of
signal. In the presence of a deterministic signal (H1 hypothesis), the sampling plan yields an
approximation to the energy consisting of the sum of squares of random variables, where the
sum has a non-central Chi-Square distribution with L degrees of freedom with the non-centrality
parameter ηk,
Tk
σ2k
'
X
2
L under H0
X 2L(ηk) under H1,
where ηk =
∑L
i=1 |h˜kyik−yij |2
σ2k
.
A. Decision Making Step
Each agent Gj makes local decisions as to whether the entire multi-agent system has reached
synchronization or not. The summary statistic for synchronization, given the entire system, may
be represented as T ? =
∑
j∈N T
∗
j , where T
∗
j =
∑
k∈N inj T
j
k for j = 1, ..., N . This then can
be compared against a threshold γ in order to decide if the system has synchronized. If this
holds for the entire event-triggered multi-agent system then the entire multi-agent network has
synchronized. Each agent Gj , however, makes its own decision on the synchronization hypothesis
using the predefined threshold γj ,
Decisionsyn =
H0 if T
∗
j < γj
H1 otherwise.
(9)
Where, γj =
∑
k∈N inj Lσ
2
k+λ (see (20)). λ is a positive constant representing the allowed margin
of error (or our confidence in the process). The exact choice of λ depends on the desired detection
and false alarm rates and is beyond the scope of work presented here. This is explained in more
details in Section VIII. We assume the threshold γj has already been selected based on perfor-
mance, detection and false alarm criteria. The relation in (9) means that if sums of differences
between an honest agent’s output and the outputs of all its neighboring agents is small enough,
then the honest agent may decide that the multi-agent system has reached synchronization.
In other words, the entire event-triggered multi-agent system has reached synchronization, if
T ∗j < γj for j = 1, ..., N .
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VI. BYZANTINE ATTACK
Multi-agent systems are vulnerable to attacks due their strong reliance on secure communi-
cation links and legitimate exchange of information. One of the most common type of such
attacks is named Byzantine. Originally, proposed in [25], a Byzantine attack may take different
forms [52], [53], our focus in this paper remains with intelligent data-falsification and weight
manipulation attacks [27], [28]. The main goals of Byzantine attackers is to first decrease the
detection probability and increase the probability of false alarms, and then to degrade the multi-
agent system’s performance. This makes the problem of the Byzantine attack and defending
against it very challenging and complicated. For the Byzantine agents, we adopt an approach that
leaves the attacker with more power than usually allowed in practice. This leads to a conservative
assessment of security risks but helps with analytical tractability. In this vein, we assume that
Byzantine agents in fact know the true hypothesis and they use this knowledge to construct
the most effective fictitious data in order to confuse the synchronization goal. This assumption
obviously is difficult (but not impossible) to satisfy in practice. For this to be possible, the
attackers should have a separate network for the cooperation amongst themselves.
As we will show in Section VII, for the entire event-triggered multi-agent network system
to reach synchronization, a connected balanced communication graph is required. In Section
VII, we also quantify the negative effects of weight manipulation resulting in an unbalanced
underlying communication graph. We assume that Byzantine agents attack the multi-agent system
from two different angles. First, the Byzantine agents disturb the underlying premise behind the
convergence of the multi-agent system by introducing new weights that will undermine the
balanced property of the underlying communication graph. Second, the Byzantine agents falsify
their own information sent to other honest agents in order to conceal their identity and also to
coerce the entire multi-agent system into following their desired behavior. The attack model, we
consider is extremely general and covers several different Byzantine plots. To be more specific, if
the event-triggered multi-agent network system is designed and initialized according to Theorem
1 by the designer to reach synchronization, then we assume that at the initialization instance,
the Byzantine agents (NB) introduce the following fictitious weights (a′k) into the underlying
communication graph,
a′k = ak + ωj ∀Gj ∈ NB, and ∀Gk ∈ N inj .
15
Additionally, at each communication instance, we assume that the Byzantine agents falsify their
information according to,
y˜j = yj ±∆j ∀Gj ∈ NB.
Where ∆j may represent the power of the attack inflicted by the Byzantine agent Gj . The
model presented above allows the Byzantine nodes to manipulate their weights and falsify their
information in a completely arbitrary manner based on their desire. As a result, the Byzantine
agents are able to conceal themselves while degrading the performance of the entire system.
A. Modeling of the Data Falsification Attack
The main goal of the Byzantine agents is to manipulate the sensing results in a stealthy way
and to reverse the synchronization status. In the presence of a synchronized state, the goal is
to ”vandalize” and move the multi-agent’s state back to the state of lack of synchronization
(H0 → H1), and in the absence of synchronization, the goal is to ”exploit” and to move the
current state to the state of the presence of synchronization at the desired value set by the
Byzantine agents (H1 → H0). This type of data injection attack is adaptive and extremely general.
Each Byzantine agent may perform a stealthy manipulation of sensing data independently. The
attack is ”adaptive”, in the sense that the data-falsification is based on the neighbors’ states,
and with the assumption that the adversary has prior knowledge on the detection algorithm. The
attack is ”covert”, in the sense that the adversary manipulates the sensing data without being
detected. Outsider attackers can be effectively expelled from the network with an authentication
mechanism. In this work, we focus on insider attackers that reside in legitimate nodes.
Based on the assumption that Byzantine agents are intelligent and know the true hypothesis,
we analyze the worst case detection performance of data-falsifications and define the attack
devised by the agent Gi as follows,
y˜i =
yi + ∆i with propabilty Pi under H0yi with propabilty 1− Pi under H0,
and,
y˜i =
yi −∆i with propabilty Pi under H1yi with propabilty 1− Pi under H1,
where Pi is the attack probability and yi is the Byzantine agent’s true time-variant output. ∆i is
a constant value that represents the strength of the attack. ∆i is set by the Byzantine agent based
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on the information it receives from its neighbors and may be positive or negative to fulfill the
”exploitation” and ”vandalism” objectives. For example, under the hypothesis H0, we may define
the test statistics ηi =
∑L
k=1 |h˜iyki −ykj |2
σ2i
≈ 0. The Byzantine agent by utilizing the attack parameter
∆i > 0 or ∆i < 0 may commit vandalism (η′i =
∑L
k=1 |h˜i(yki +∆i)−ykj |2
σ2i
≈ Lh˜2i∆2i , H0 → H1).
Under the hypothesis H1, we may define the mean values µj = 1L
∑L
k=1 y
k
j , µi =
1
L
∑L
k=1 h˜iy
k
i ,
and ηi =
∑L
k=1 |h˜iyii−ykj |2
σ2i
for an honest communication from agent Gi to the host agent Gj and
η′i =
∑L
k=1 |h˜i(yki −∆i)−ykj |2
σ2i
for a Byzantine communication from agent Gi to the host agent Gj
over the detection interval L. One can see that, η′i = ηi +
∑L
k=1(h˜
2
i∆
2
i+2h˜i∆iy
k
j−2h˜2i∆iyki )
σ2i
, hence
the Byzantine agent with the selection of ∆i >
2(µi−µj)
h˜i
may commit an exploitative attack
(H1 → H0). Lastly, the Byzantine agent can adaptively estimate the relationship between its true
output and its neighboring outputs based on the information it receives and accordingly set the
value of ∆i.
This modeling of Byzantine attacks is quite common in literature and covers a vast domain of
adversary models [26]. The above inequalities show the basic principle in terms of the amount
of changes an attacker has to inject in order to fulfill ”exploitation” and ”vandalism” objectives,
respectively. Lastly, as shown later, Byzantine agents will use large values for ∆i’s so that the
magnitude of the local test statistics are dominated by the Byzantine agents’ outputs and the
degradation of the detection performance and the overall system’s performance is maximized.
This is, however, in odds with the Byzantine agents’ other objective to conceal themselves. As
a result, the Byzantine agents will have to choose their parameters wisely in order to fulfill both
concealment and performance degradation objectives.
VII. MAIN RESULTS
A. Synchronization Results
Theorem 1. Consider the event-triggered multi-agent system described in Section IV, where
each sub-system Gj is output passive with the output passivity index ρj and is controlled by the
input mechanism given in (2). If the underlying connected communication graph is balanced,
the communication time-delays and disturbances are negligible, and the communication attempts
amongst all agents Gj where j = 1, ..., N , are governed by the triggering conditions,
||ej(t)||22 > δj||yj(t)||22,
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where the design parameters δj are chosen such that,
0 < δj ≤
2
|N inj |
(λ(G) + ρj)− 1α − 1β
α + β
,
where α > 0 and β > 0 are design variables and λ(G) is the connectivity of the underly-
ing communication graph, then the entire event-triggered multi-agent system achieves output
synchronization asymptotically.
Proof. Each agent Gj is output passive with the storage function (Lyapunov function) Vj where,
V˙j(t) ≤ uTj (t)yj(t)− ρjyTj (t)yj(t), ∀t > 0,
where the output passivity level is indicated by ρj ∈ R. uj, yj ∈ Rm are the inputs and outputs
of appropriate dimensions for the agent Gj . The error of the triggering condition for agent j
is defined as ej(t) = yj(t) − yj(tni ) for triggering instances n = 0, 1, 2, .... Accordingly, for
each agent, we have eTj (t)ej(t) ≤ δjyTj (t)yj(t) between each two triggering instances. Given the
control input in (2), and the framework described in Section IV, the input to the agent Gj is
defined as,
uj =
∑
k∈N inj
ak(yk(t
n
k)− yj(tnj )) =
∑
k∈N inj
ak[(yk(t)− ek(t))− (yj(t)− ej(t))],
where n = 0, 1, 2, ... are the triggering instances. The relationship for the storage function of
agent Gj becomes,
V˙j ≤
∑
k∈N inj
ak[(yk(t)− ek(t))− (yj(t)− ej(t))]Tyj(t)− ρjyTj (t)yj(t)
=
∑
k∈N ini
ak[(yk(t)− yj(t))− (ek(t)− ej(t))]Tyj(t)− ρjyTj (t)yj(t).
In order to show synchronization for all N agents, we consider the following storage function
for the entire multi-agent system,
S˙ =
N∑
j=1
V˙j ≤
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
ak[(yk(t)− yj(t))− (ek(t)− ej(t))]Tyj(t)−
N∑
j=1
ρjy
T
j (t)yj(t).
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As we explained in Section III and Section IV, the flow of information amongst agents may be
represented by the Laplacian of the underlying communication graph L. Moreover, if we define
the matrix E = [eT1 , e
T
2 , ..., e
T
N ]
T , then we have,
S˙ =
N∑
j=1
V˙j ≤ −Y TLTY + Y TLTE −
N∑
j=1
ρjy
T
j (t)yj(t) (10)
≤ −λ(G)Y TY + Y TLTE −
N∑
j=1
ρjy
T
j (t)yj(t), (11)
where λ(G) > 0 represents the algebraic connectivity of the underlying connected communica-
tion graph. Next, we may show the following,
Y TLTE = ETLY =
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
ak(yj(t)− yk(t))T ej(t)
=
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
aky
T
j (t)ej(t)−
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
aky
T
k (t)ej(t). (12)
For all j and k, we can have: yTj (t)ej(t) ≤
αeTj (t)ej(t)
2
+
yTj (t)yj(t)
2α
and yTj (t)ej(t) ≤
βeTj (t)ej(t)
2
+
yTk (t)yk(t)
2β
where α, β > 0. Utilizing these relationships in (12), we have,
Y TLTE ≤
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
ak[
αeTj (t)ej(t)
2
+
yTj (t)yj(t)
2α
]
+
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
ak[
βeTj (t)ej(t)
2
+
yTk (t)yk(t)
2β
].
This can be further simplified to have,
Y TLTE ≤
N∑
j=1
|N inj |[
(α + β)eTj (t)ej(t)
2
+
yTj (t)yj(t)
2α
]
+
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
ak[
yTk (t)yk(t)
2β
].
Further, we know that between any two triggering instances, one can show eTj (t)ej(t) ≤ δjyTj (t)yj(t).
This further gives us,
Y TLTE ≤
N∑
j=1
|N inj |[
(α + β)δj
2
+
1
2α
]yTj (t)yj(t)
+
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
ak[
yTk (t)yk(t)
2β
].
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We have assumed that the underlying communication graph is balanced. This property implies
that
∑N
j=1
∑
k∈N inj ak[
yTk (t)yk(t)
2β
] =
∑N
j=1 |N inj |[
yTj (t)yj(t)
2β
]. This leads to,
Y TLTE ≤
N∑
j=1
|N inj |[
(α + β)δj
2
+
1
2α
+
1
2β
]yTj (t)yj(t). (13)
Utilizing (13) in (11), we have,
S˙ =
N∑
j=1
V˙j ≤ −λ(G)Y TY −
N∑
j=1
ρjy
T
j (t)yj(t)
+
N∑
j=1
|N inj |[
(α + β)δj
2
+
1
2α
+
1
2β
]yTj (t)yj(t). (14)
We introduce the square diagonal matrix Θ ∈ RN×N , where
[Θ]j,i =
+λ(G) + ρj − |N
in
j |[ (α+β)δj2 + 12α + 12β ] if j = i
0 otherwise.
Given (6) and Θ, (14) becomes,
S˙ ≤ −Y T∆ ΘY∆.
If the event-triggered multi-agent system is designed according to the theorem such that for
each node Gj , we have: δj ≤
2
|N in
j
| (λ(G)+ρj)−
1
α
− 1
β
α+β
then matrix Θ is semi-positive. Moreover, for
the storage function S we have: S ≥ 0 and S˙ ≤ 0 for ∀y ∈ Rm and ∀t ≥ 0. This implies S˙ → 0
as t → ∞ according to Barbalat’s Lemma [42]. Consequently, Y∆ converges to the limit set
D = {x|Y∆ = 0, x ∈ RmN} for all states of all agents,
0 ≤ Y T∆ ΘY∆ ≤ −S˙
This also means that the entire multi-agent system synchronizes asymptotically.
Remark 1. The triggering conditions show that agents that are more passive with higher
output passivity indices can have larger triggering intervals and will be required to send their
information to the network less frequently.
Remark 2. Graph connectivity has a relation with the communication rate amongst agents as
well. The higher the connectivity of the underlying communication graph for the multi-agent
system is, the larger the triggering intervals may be (less frequent communication attempts).
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Remark 3. The result presented in Theorem 1 also shows that agents with a higher number of
neighbors will be required to send their information to the network more frequently compared
to others. In other words, agents with a high number of neighbors play a more crucial part
in the synchronization process of the entire multi-agent system. This is due to the fact that the
triggering conditions show a reciprocal relationship between triggering intervals and number of
neighbors. If an agent is responsible for sending its information to a higher number of neighbors
(a higher number of neighboring agents rely on its information), then the agent will have to
update its neighbors more frequently.
Remark 4. It is important to note that we did not consider the effects of external disturbances
and time-delays in Theorem 1. It is assumed that these effects are negligible. However, if the
delays are large enough, or external disturbances are strong enough, then they may affect the
performance of the entire system.
Remark 5. The results in Theorem 1 are quite lenient. More specifically, they may hold for
non-passive systems as well. For agent Gj , the triggering instance δj should be chosen such
that +λ(G) + ρj − |N inj |[ (α+β)δj2 + 12α + 12β ] > 0. It is clear that for a non-passive system with a
shortage of output passivity ρj , one can still design a multi-agent system that will synchronize
as long as δj is chosen such that, 0 < δj ≤
2
|N in
j
| (λ(G)+ρj)−
1
α
− 1
β
α+β
.
B. Zeno-Behavior Analysis
In practical settings, it may be necessary to guarantee a lower-bound on the time-intervals
between triggering instances. The main motivation behind this problem is to avoid Zeno-behavior
for the triggering conditions. Zeno-behavior happens when an infinite number of triggering
conditions are met in a finite time-interval defeating the purpose of the event-triggered control
framework. In order to avoid this behavior, we introduce a small positive constant c to the
triggering conditions to guarantee a positive lower-bound. We have shown before that the
triggering conditions given in Theorem 1 do gauarntee a positive lower-bound for inner-event
time instances [54]. Here, we show that our synchronization results does hold for the triggering
condition ||ej(t)||22 > δj||yj(t)||22 +c for j = 1, ..., N as well. As a result, in practical applications
one can use this triggering condition to secure a positive lower-bound, if necessary.
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Corollary 1. Consider the event-triggered multi-agent system described in Section IV, where each
sub-system Gj is output passive with the output passivity index ρj and is controlled by the input
given in 2. If the underlying connected communication graph is balanced, the communication
time-delays and disturbances are negligible, and the communication attempts amongst all agents
Gj where j = 1, ..., N , are governed by the triggering conditions,
||ej(t)||22 > δj||yj(t)||22 + c,
where the design parameters δj are chosen such that,
0 < δj ≤
2
|N inj |
(λ(G) + ρj)− 1α − 1β
α + β
,
then the entire event-triggered network system achieves output synchronization asymptotically.
Proof: The proof follows the same line of reasoning as the proof given for Theorem 1.
Following the same steps, one can show that,
Y TLTE ≤
N∑
j=1
|N inj |[
(α + β)δj
2
+
1
2α
]yTj (t)yj(t)
+
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
ak[
yTk (t)yk(t)
2β
] +
N∑
j=1
|N inj |[
(α + β)c
2
].
Further, one sees,
S˙ =
N∑
j=1
V˙j ≤ −λ(G)Y TY −
N∑
j=1
ρjy
T
j (t)yj(t)
+
N∑
j=1
|N inj |[
(α + β)δj
2
+
1
2α
+
1
2β
]yTj (t)yj(t) +
N∑
j=1
|N inj |[
(α + β)c
2
].
By introducing the same matrix given in Theorem 1, Θ, one has,
S˙ ≤ −Y T∆ ΘY∆ +
N∑
j=1
|N inj |[
(α + β)c
2
].
For small values of c, and if the event-triggered multi-agent system is design according to the
corollary such that for each node Gj , we have: δj ≤
2
|N in
j
| (λ(G)+ρj)−
1
α
− 1
β
α+β
then matrix Θ is semi-
positive. Moreover, for the storage function S we have: S ≥ 0 and S˙ ≤ 0 for ∀y ∈ Rm and
∀t ≥ 0. This implies S˙ → 0 as t→∞ according to Barbalat’s Lemma [42]. Consequently, Y∆
converges to the limit set D = {x|Y∆ = 0, x ∈ RmN} for all states of all agents, which proves
the corollary.
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Remark 6. Corollary 1, shows a trade-off between communication rate and performance. It is
clear that for very large values of c (very low communication rate), the synchronization state
degrades quickly. In other words, synchronization is upper-bounded according to the relation,
Y T∆ ΘY∆ <
∑N
j=1 |N inj |[ (α+β)c2 ]. As a result, the designer should consider this trade-off before
selecting the design parameter c. However, synchronization is possible based on the assumption
that c is chosen to be a very small positive number, and as a result the selection of c is not
consequential for the synchronization of the overall system.
C. Effects of Byzantine Agents on Synchronization
We assume that amongst N agents, there are NB Byzantine nodes with the attack model
described in Section VI and NH honest nodes (NH +NB = N ). NH and NB represent the set of
honest and Byzantine agents, respectively. We represent the honest and Byzantine neighboring
agents for Gj by N inHj and N inBj (N inHj ∩N inBj = ∅, N inHj ∪N inBj = N inj ). |N inj | represents the
same cardinality definition as given in Theorem 1. We define the cardinality of N injB , |N injB | as
only the number of neighbors for the Byzantine agents excluding their communication weights.
|N injB | is zero for honest agents. The set of all Byzantine agents is represented by NB and the
set of all honest agents is represented by NH . For the honest agent GHj , the input under both
hypotheses may be presented as,
uHj =
∑
k∈N inj
ak(yk(t
n
k)− yj(tnj )) =
∑
k∈N inj
ak[(yk(t)− yj(t))− (e′k(t)− ej(t))],
where,
e′k(t) =
ek(t)±∆k if Gk ∈ N
inB
j
ek(t) otherwise.
For the Byzantine agent GBj , the input may be presented as,
uBj =
∑
k∈N inj
aBk (yk(t
n
k)− yj(tnj )) =
∑
k∈N inj
aBk [(yk(t)− yj(t))− (e′k(t)− ej(t))],
where, aBk = ak + ωj . The Lyapunov storage function for the entire multi-agent event-triggered
network system becomes,
S˙ =
N∑
j=1
V˙j ≤
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
a′k[(yk(t)− yj(t))− (e′k(t)− ej(t))]Tyj(t)−
N∑
j=1
ρjy
T
j (t)yj(t).
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where,
a′k =
ak + ωj if Gj ∈ N
B
ak, otherwise.
It is important to note that ωj = 0 for honest agents. First, it can be shown that,
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
a′k(yk(t)− yj(t))Tyj(t)
=
∑
j∈NB
∑
k∈N inj
(ak + ωj)(yk(t)− yj(t))Tyj(t) +
∑
j∈NH
∑
k∈N inj
ak(yk(t)− yj(t))Tyj(t)
=
∑
j∈NB
∑
k∈N inj
ωj(yk(t)− yj(t))Tyj(t) +
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
ak(yk(t)− yj(t))Tyj(t)
≤
∑
j∈NB
∑
k∈N inj
ωjy
T
k (t)yk(t)
4
+
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
ak(yk(t)− yj(t))Tyj(t).
As a result, we have,
S˙ =
N∑
j=1
V˙j ≤ −Y TLTY + Y TL′TE ′ −
N∑
j=1
ρjy
T
j (t)yj(t)
+
∑
j∈NB
∑
k∈N inj
ωjy
T
k (t)yk(t)
4
,
where,
E ′j,1 =
ej(t)±∆j if Gj ∈ N
B
ej(t) otherwise,
and L′ is the Laplacian matrix of the new underlying communication graph consisting of a′k’s
and is defined as,
[L′]j,i =

∑
k∈N inj a
′
k if j = i
−a′k if there is an arc from Gi to Gj with the gain a′k.
From Section IV, we remember,
Y¯ =
1
N
1TNY =
1
N
N∑
i=1
yi,
and the measure for synchronization for the multi-agent system,
Y∆ = (y1 − Y¯ , y2 − Y¯ , ..., yN − Y¯ )T .
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We may follow the same steps as given in Theorem 1, and get to the following,
S˙ =
N∑
j=1
V˙j ≤ −Y TLTY +
N∑
j=1
(|N inj |[
1
2α
+
1
2β
] + |N injB |
ωj
2α
)yTj (t)yj(t)
+
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
a′k[
(α + β)
2
]e′
T
j (t)e
′
j(t)−
N∑
j=1
ρjy
T
j (t)yj(t)
+
∑
j∈NB
∑
k∈N inj
(
1
4
+
1
2β
)ωjy
T
k (t)yk(t)
≤ −λ(G)Y TY +
N∑
j=1
[(|N inj |[
1
2α
+
1
2β
] + |N injB |
ωj
2α
)− ρj]yTj (t)yj(t)
+
N∑
j=1
(|N inj |+ |N injB |ωj)[
(α + β)
2
]e′
T
j (t)e
′
j(t) +
∑
j∈NB
∑
k∈N inj
(
1
4
+
1
2β
)ωjy
T
k (t)yk(t), (15)
where α and β are the same parameters as given in Theorem 1. One can clearly quantify the
negative effects, Byzantine nodes introduce to the entire framework by comparing (15) and
(14). The error term in (15) can be expanded as well by utilizing (ej(t)±∆j)T (ej(t)±∆j) ≤
2(eTj (t)ej(t) + ∆
2
j) , leading to the following,
S˙ ≤ −λ(G)Y TY +
N∑
j=1
[(|N inj |[
1
2α
+
1
2β
] + |N injB |
ωj
2α
)− ρj]yTj (t)yj(t)
+ (α + β)[
N∑
j=1
(|N inj |+ |N injB |ωj)eTj (t)ej(t) +
∑
j∈NB
(|N inj |+ |N injB |ωj)∆2j ]
+
∑
j∈NB
∑
k∈N inj
(
1
4
+
1
2β
)ωjy
T
k (t)yk(t). (16)
We introduce the same square diagonal matrix Θ ∈ RN×N , where,
[Θ]j,i =
+λ(G) + ρj − |N
in
j |[ (α+β)δj2 + 12α + 12β ] if j = i
0 otherwise.
Given (6), (16) and Θ, we have,
S˙ ≤ −Y T∆ ΘY∆ +
∑
j∈NB
|N injB |
ωj
2α
yTj (t)yj(t)
+ (α + β)[
N∑
j=1
(
|N inj |
2
+ |N injB |ωj)eTj (t)ej(t) +
∑
j∈NB
(|N inj |+ |N injB |ωj)∆2j ]
+
∑
j∈NB
∑
k∈N inj
(
1
4
+
1
2β
)ωjy
T
k (t)yk(t). (17)
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Given the assumption that the multi-agent system was initially designed according to Theorem
1, we have Θ > 0. After simplifying, and given S˙ → 0 as t→∞, we have,
0 < −Y T∆ ΘY∆ +
∑
j∈NB
|N injB |
ωj
2α
yTj (t)yj(t)
+ (α + β)[
N∑
j=1
(
|N inj |
2
+ |N injB |ωj)eTj (t)ej(t) +
∑
j∈NB
(|N inj |+ |N injB |ωj)∆2j ]
+
∑
j∈NB
∑
k∈N inj
(
1
4
+
1
2β
)ωjy
T
k (t)yk(t). (18)
(18) quantifies the effects of weight distortions and number of neighboring Byzantine agents on
the convergence of the entire multi-agent system. More specifically, if one assumes the system
is designed according to Theorem 1 but initialized with the presence of Byzantine nodes then
one can show an upper-bound for the effects of Byzantine agents on synchronization,
0 < Y T∆ ΘY∆ ≤
∑
j∈NB
|N injB |
ωj
2α
yTj (t)yj(t)
+ (α + β)[
N∑
j=1
(
|N inj |
2
+ |N injB |ωj)eTj (t)ej(t) +
∑
j∈NB
(|N inj |+ |N injB |ωj)∆2j ]
+
∑
j∈NB
∑
k∈N inj
(
1
4
+
1
2β
)ωjy
T
k (t)yk(t). (19)
It is obvious that in the presence of Byzantine agents, Y∆ 6= 0, as the honest agents will only
be able to synchronize to a value that is based on the wrong data receiving from Byzantine agents
(y±∆). In the best scenario, yH , yB → Y¯ ′ = YH+YBN , where YB represents the Byzantine outputs
of all Byzantine agents sent to their neighbors and YH represents the true outputs of honest
agents. More specifically, if one assumes that the multi-agent system is designed according to
Theorem 1 but initialized with the presence of Byzantine agents then one can show a lower-
bound and an upper-bound for the effects of Byzantine agents on synchronization and outputs of
agents. The lower-bound happens when all agents synchronize to the wrong value Y ′. However,
even the synchronization to this false value is not guaranteed anymore due to the positive upper-
bound given in (19). The positive upper-bound given in (19) characterizes the worst possible
outcome inflicted upon the multi-agent system by the Byzantine agents. For honest agents,
(19) demonstrates an upper-bound for the largest possible deviation caused by Byzantine agents
between the honest agent’s output and the correct synchronized value. Number of Byzantine
nodes has a direct relation to this effect on synchronization. A larger number of Byzantine nodes
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Fig. 2. Graph - Byzantine Example.
can have a larger effect on deviating the multi-agent system from its true synchronized value.
Additionally, there is the same direct effect between the Byzantine weights and synchronization,
namely, the larger the Byzantine weights are, the larger deviations from the true synchronized
value are. To sum up, there is a direct relationship between the upper-bound of deviations from the
synchronized point (output over-shoot) and number of Byzantine neighbors and their associated
Byzantine weights. The positive term involving ∆2j shows the relationship between the data
falsification parameters and synchronization. The same direct relationship holds here as well.
Falsifying the data by increasing the magnitudes of ∆j directly weakens the synchronization
of the entire multi-agent system. These results also show that an honest agent with a single
Byzantine neighbor may never reach synchronization as the Byzantine neighbor by establishing
the value of ∆j and ωj may consistently distract the honest node from reaching the synchronized
value. Lastly, the positive term involving ∆2j guarantees a positive upper-bound for all agents,
no matter if an agent has a Byzantine neighbor or not.
As an example, let’s look at the multi-agent system given in Fig. 2. We assume that in the five
agent system G1, G4, G5 ∈ NH and the rest are Byzantine agents. The honest agent G1 has only
one Byzantine neighbor G2 with parameters ∆ and ω. We assume that the data falsifications for
G2 and G3 have a positive addition sign, yB2(t) = y2(t) + ∆ and yB3(t) = y3(t) + ∆. yB(t) is
the output of Byzantine agent after data falsification. We have assumed that agent G2 itself has
another Byzantine neighbor G3 (|N in3B | = 0, |N in3 | = 1 with parameters ∆ and ω). G4 and G5
are honest nodes. If |N inB1 | = 1, |N in1 | = 2 for G1, α = 1, β = 1, λ(G) = 1, ρ1 = 1.9, δ1 = 0.4,
N = 5. Given that |N in2B | = 1, |N in2 | = 1 and with the assumption that ρ2 = 0.8, δ2 = 0.3 for G2
(Notice that δ1 and δ2 meet the synchronization conditions given in Theorem 1), for agents G1
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and G2 at their respective triggering instances tk (e
T
1 (tk)e1(tk) = 0, e
T
2 (tk)e2(tk) = 0), we have,
0 < 0.1(y1(tk)− Y¯ (tk))2 ≤ (2 + ω)∆2 + 0.5ωyT2 (tk)y2(tk)
+ 0.75ω(yT1 (tk)y1(tk) + y
T
3 (tk)y3(tk)),
0 < 0.5(y2(tk)− Y¯ (tk))2 ≤ (2 + ω)∆2 + 0.5ωyT2 (tk)y2(tk)
+ 0.75ω(yT1 (tk)y1(tk) + y
T
3 (tk)y3(tk)),
where Y¯ (tk) =
y1(tk)+yB2 (tk)−∆+yB3 (tk)−∆+y4(tk)+y5(tk)
5
. This means that a single Byzantine agent
can overtake an honest agent and control its behavior by determining the parameters ω and
∆. Additionally, the Byzantine agents can affect Y¯ through agent G1. This also means that if
each honest agent in the network has only one Byzantine neighborhood and if all Byzantine
neighborhoods work together by utilizing the same Byzantine parameters ∆ and ω then the
Byzantine agents can coerce the entire multi-agent system into following their desired behavior.
However, for this attack to be meaningful, the values ∆ and ω should be large enough to disrupt
the overall performance of the multi-agent system. As we will see in the following sections, larger
values of ∆ and ω are easy to detect given our proposed detection framework. As a result a single
Byzantine neighbor can be identified easily and its negative effects can be easily mitigated. In
order for the Byzantine attack to be successful, each honest node should have more than only one
Byzantine neighbor and N inBj should be large enough. Our aim is to characterize the relationship
between the number of Byzantine neighbors, detection performance, and synchronization. We
will show the minimum number of Byzantine neighbors, an honest agent should have before
the detection process is entirely blinded and the Byzantine agents become undetectable. We
characterize the most efficient Byzantine attack. Lastly, we propose a more resilient algorithm
for synchronization of the multi-agent systems.
Passivity and Effects of Byzantine Agents: Passivity to some extent can compensate and
mitigate the negative effects of Byzantine agents. We later illustrate this through an example.
One can determine from (19), that for larger diagonal entries of Θ, the effects of agents’ output
overshoot, or the size of the largest possible deviation from Y¯ may be mitigated and decreased.
From the definition of Θ, one can see that the excess of passivity may lead to a larger entry
for agent Gj in Θ and a better worst case scenario in terms of deviations from the desired
value Y¯ . For all agent Gj where j = 1, ..., N , we can represent ρj = ρ′j + ρ
∆
j > 0, where
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′ − ρ′j = λ(G)− |N inj |[ (α+β)δj2 + 12α + 12β ], with ′ > 0. Then (19) becomes,
0 < Y T∆ Θ
?Y∆ ≤
∑
j∈NB
|N injB |
ωj
2α
yTj (t)yj(t)
+ (α + β)[
N∑
j=1
(
|N inj |
2
+ |N injB |ωj)eTj (t)ej(t) +
∑
j∈NB
(|N inj |+ |N injB |ωj)∆2j ]
+
∑
j∈NB
∑
k∈N inBj
(
1
4
+
1
2β
)ωjy
T
k (t)yk(t)− Y TΘρ∆Y.
where
[Θρ∆ ]j,i =
ρ
∆
j if j = i
0 otherwise.
[Θ?]j,i =

′ if j = i
0 otherwise.
This means that an excess of passivity in agents can compensate for the negative effects of
Byzantine weight and data manipulation. A design-based interpretation of this result tells us that
one can design the triggering conditions (see 1) such that ρ∆j > 0 for all agents, in order to
increase the resilience of the entire event-triggered multi-agent system. However, this results in
a decrease in the size of triggering intervals and a higher communication rate amongst agents.
But the conclusion is that more passive multi-agent systems are also more resilient toward this
type of Byzantine attack.
D. Simulation Example
Example 1. We consider a multi-agent event-triggered network system consisting of five agents
(i = 1, ..., 5) with the underlying balanced communication topology given in Fig. 3. We assume
the following simple dynamics for sub-systems,
Gi =
x˙i(t) = −cixi(t) + ui(t)yi(t) = xi(t),
with c1 = 1.2, c2 = 2.2, c3 = 2.4, c4 = 0.6, c5 = 4. One can verify that all agents are
dissipative with the storage function Vi(x) = 12x
T
i (t)xi(t). This results in output passivity indices,
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Fig. 3. Graph - Example 1.
ρ1 = 1.2, ρ2 = 2.2, ρ3 = 2.4, ρ4 = 0.6, ρ5 = 4. The Laplacian matrix of the underlying
communication graph amongst agents is,
L =

2 −1 −1 0 0
0 3 −2 0 −1
0 0 3 0 −3
0 −1 0 1 0
−2 −1 0 −1 4

.
with the connectivity measure: λ(G) = 1.234. Based on Theorem 1, one can design the following
triggering conditions,
||e1(t)||22 > 0.21||y1(t)||22,
||e2(t)||22 > 0.14||y2(t)||22,
||e3(t)||22 > 0.20||y3(t)||22,
||e4(t)||22 > 0.60||y4(t)||22,
||e5(t)||22 > 0.29||y5(t)||22,
by selecting αi = 1, βi = 1 for i = 1, ..., 5. For initial conditions, y1(0) = 5, y2(0) =
10, y3(0) = −5, y4(0) = 1, y5(0) = −3, Fig.4 shows that the system synchronizes. Fig. 5
shows the evolution of triggering condition for each agent and shows that Zeno-behavior does
not happen and the event-triggered premise is met.
Now, we show the effects of a Byzantine attack on the multi-agent system to affirm our results
in the previous sub-section. We consider the case where agent G1 is compromised. First, we
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Fig. 4. The Outputs of the Multi-Agent System.
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Fig. 6. The Multi-Agent System’s behavior under Data Falsification.
assume that G1 has not manipulated its weight but that it only manipulates the information it is
sending to other agents. G1 sends Y˜1 = Y1 + ∆ where ∆ = 10 instead of sending its true value.
Fig 6 shows the effects of the Byzantine agent on synchronization. As expected, the convergence
deviates from the correct synchronized value by a positive magnitude which depends on ∆,
additionally, the error propagates through the network and affects other honest agents. Lastly,
we consider the effects of weight manipulation and data falsification together. We assume that
agent G5 has changed its input weight a1 = 2 to a′1 = 8 and also sends the same false data
Y˜ to its neighbors. As shown in Fig. 7, a single Byzantine agent is able to deceive the entire
multi-agent system into following its desired behavior by manipulating its weight and falsifying
its data. Moreover, as expected, comparing Fig 6 and Fig. 7, we see that by combining weight
manipulation and data falsification, the upper-bound for all outputs of all agents has increased.
It is important to note that in our analysis of attack parameters, we did not consider the attack
probability (P ). This was to characterize the worst possible effect the Byzantine attack may have
on the entire system. In the following sections we will expand the above work to consider the
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Fig. 7. The Multi-Agent System’s behavior under both Weight Manipulation and Data Falsification.
probability of attack. Next, we will analyze the performance of the detection unit.
VIII. AN ANALYSIS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DETECTION FRAMEWORK
A. Transient Performance Analysis of the Detection Algorithm
In this subsection, we analyze the transient performance of the detection framework. This
analysis is based on characterization of the probability of correctly detecting that the multi-
agent system is under attack and detecting the true signal (probability of detection) and the
probability of false alarm; incorrectly determining that the multi-agent system has not reached
synchronization when indeed it has (failing to detect the attack). As mentioned in Section VI,
Byzantine nodes attempt to replace the hypothesis H0 with H1 and vice versa. The probability of
detection characterizes the ability of the detection unit to discover the Byzantine agents’ attempt
to ”exploit” (H1 → H0). The false alarm probability characterizes the probability that the detec-
tion unit does not detect the Byzantine agents’ objective to ”vandalize” (H0 → H1) and falsely
decides the non-existence of an attack. This means that even-though the system has reached
synchronization, the detection unit follows the falsified information received from the Byzantine
agents and decides against synchronization. The transient analysis of the detection unit is based
on the hypothesis testing presented in (9). We remember that each agent Gj independently
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calculates its local statistics with each neighbor Gk, according to T
j
k =
∑L
i=1 |yik − yij|2 over the
time-interval of length L. The overall local statistics with all neighbors of Gj , which is utilized
in the decision making process given in (9) at time-instance t, becomes ∧tj = (
∑
k∈N inj T
j
k )
t.
We also remember that according to the framework presented in Section VI, the Byzantine
agents are intelligent, know the true hypothesis, and will attempt to exploit and vandalize the
synchronization process by confusing the detection framework and diverging the synchronization
process by falsifying their data. In this subsection, we characterize the transient degradation
of the detection performance in the presence of Byzantine neighbors. The local test statistic
for the detection unit of an honest agents in the presence of honest and Byzantine neighbors
at time-instance t is (
∑
k∈N inj T
j
k )
t = (
∑
k∈N inHj
T jk )
t + (
∑
k∈N inBj
T˜ jk )
t. For sufficiently large
number of local test statistics of length L, the distribution of the test statistics with a Byzantine
neighbor Gk, T˜
j
k , given the hypothesis Hi (i = 0, 1) is a Gaussian mixture of N ((µi0)k, (σ2i0)k)
with probability (1− Pk) and N ((µi1)k, (σ2i1)k) with probability Pk. The distribution of the test
statistics from an honest neighbor Gk, T
j
k , given the hypothesis Hi (i = 0, 1) is a Gaussian
distribution N ((µi0)k, (σ2i0)k), where,
(µ00)k = Lσ
2
k, (µ01)k = Lσ
2
k + Lh˜
2
k∆
2
kσ
2
k (20)
(µ10)k = (L+ ηk)σ
2
k, (µ11)k = (L+ η
′
k)σ
2
k (21)
(σ200)k = 2Lσ
4
k, (σ
2
01)k = 2(L+ 2Lh˜
2
k∆
2
k)σ
4
k (22)
(σ210)k = 2(L+ 2ηk)σ
4
k, (σ
2
11)k = 2(L+ 2η
′
k)σ
4
k (23)
As a result the probability distribution of T˜ jk becomes,
fPDF (T˜k|Hi) = (1− Pk)φ((µi0)k, (σ2i0)k) + Pkφ((µi1)k, (σ2i1)k), i = 0, 1. (24)
φ(µ, σ2i0) is the probability distribution function of X ' N (µ, σ2). In order to attain a closed
form for the transient probability distribution of the detection center, first we start with a simple
example and then expand the results to the general case. For the sake of convenience, we assume
that Pk = P for all k ∈ N inBj . If we assume that agent Gj has 2 Byzantine neighbors (G1, G2)
and 2 Honest neighbors (G3, G4) , at time-instance t, we have ∧tj = (T˜ j1 )t+(T˜ j2 )t+(T j3 )t+(T j4 )t.
∧tj is the result of the summation of independent random variables. Consequently, the distribution
of ∧tj is the result of the convolution of the distribution of these independent random variables,
fPDF (∧tj|Hk) = fPDF ((T˜ j1 )t|Hk) ∗ fPDF ((T˜ j2 )t|Hk) ∗ fPDF ((T j3 )t|Hk) ∗ fPDF ((T j4 )t|Hk), k = 0, 1.
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Further we have,
fPDF (∧tj|Hk) = [(1− P1)φ((µk0)1, (σ2k0)1) + P1φ((µk1)1, (σ2k1)1)]
∗ [(1− P2)φ((µk0)2, (σ2k0)2) + P2φ((µk1)2, (σ2k1)2)]
∗ φ(µ3, σ23) ∗ φ(µ4, σ24),
= (1− P1)(1− P2)φ((µk0)1, (σ2k0)1) ∗ φ((µk0)2, (σ2k0)2) ∗ φ(µ3, σ23) ∗ φ(µ4, σ24)
+ (1− P1)P2φ((µk0)1, (σ2k0)1) ∗ φ((µk1)2, (σ2k1)2) ∗ φ(µ3, σ23) ∗ φ(µ4, σ24)
+ P1(1− P2)φ((µk1)1, (σ2k1)1) ∗ φ((µk0)2, (σ2k0)2) ∗ φ(µ3, σ23) ∗ φ(µ4, σ24)
+ P1P2φ((µk1)1, (σ
2
k1)1) ∗ φ((µk1)2, (σ2k1)2) ∗ φ(µ3, σ23) ∗ φ(µ4, σ24), k = 0, 1.
Given the fact that the convolution of two normal distributions is also a normal distribution with
a mean and variance resulting from the summation of the means and variances of the initial
normal distributions, and that Pk = P for all k ∈ N inBj , we have,
fPDF (∧tj|Hk) = (1− P )(1− P )φ((µk0)1 + (µk0)2 + µ3 + µ4, (σ2k0)1 + (σ2k0)2 + σ23 + σ24)
+ (1− P )Pφ((µk0)1 + (µk1)2 + µ3 + µ4, (σ2k0)1 + (σ2k1)2 + σ23 + σ24)
+ P (1− P )φ((µk1)1 + (µk0)2 + µ3 + µ4, (σ2k1)1 + (σ2k0)2 + σ23 + σ24)
+ P 2φ((µk1)1 + (µk1)2 + µ3 + µ4, (σ
2
k1)1 + (σ
2
k1)2 + σ
2
3 + σ
2
4), k = 0, 1.
Byzantine agents behave probabilistically in the sense that their states change from Byzantine
to honest and vice versa with a probability that depends on P . We define the set ZB as the
combination of Byzantine states for Byzantine agents such that for this example, we have, ZB =
{{H1, H2}, {B1, H2}, {H1, B2}, {B1, B2}}, where the presence of Bi or Hi in the combinations
of states indicates that the Byzantine agent Gi is behaving as a Byzantine or honest agent,
respectively. We denote Z indB as indices of Byzantine agents in ZB states, Z indB = {Z1 =
{}, Z2 = {1}, Z3 = {2}, Z4 = {1, 2}}. As a result we have the complement set, C(Z indB ) =
{Zc1 = {1, 2}, Zc2 = {2}, Zc3 = {1}, Zc4 = {}}. Needless to say, we have the following cardinality
relationship, |Zi|+ |NH | = N .
Lemma 1. The probability distribution function of the local test statistic for agent Gj with NB
Byzantine neighbors and NH honest agents with the detection time-interval L, at time-instance
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t, given the hypothesis Hi (i = 0, 1), ∧tj is a Gaussian mixture determined by,
fPDF (∧tj|Hk) =
∑
Zi∈ZindB
P |Zi|(1− P )NB−|Zi|φ(µ, σ2), where,
µ =
∑
i∈Zci
(µk0)i +
∑
i∈Zi
(µk1)i +
∑
i∈NH
(µk0)i,
σ2 =
∑
i∈Zci
(σ2k0)i +
∑
i∈Zi
(σ2k1)i +
∑
i∈NH
(σ2k0)i, and k = 0, 1.
Consequently, the transient performance of the detection unit of agent Gj may be characterized
by the probability of detection and false alarm as follows,
Proposition 1. The probability of detection and false alarm of the detection unit for agent Gj
at time-instance t may be characterized as,
(P jD)
t = Pr(D = H1|H1)
=
∑
Zi∈ZindB
P |Zi|(1− P )NB−|Zi|Q(
γj −
∑
i∈Zci (µ10)i −
∑
i∈Zi(µ11)i −
∑
i∈NH (µ10)i√∑
i∈N (σ
2
10)i
),
(P jFA)
t = Pr(D = H1|H0)
=
∑
Zi∈ZindB
P |Zi|(1− P )NB−|Zi|Q(
γj −
∑
i∈Zci (µ00)i −
∑
i∈Zi(µ01)i −
∑
i∈NH (µ00)i√∑
i∈N (σ
2
00)i
).
Proof. (P jD)
t can be easily derived from calculating Pr(D = H1|H1) from a combination of
Gaussian distributions with the following means and variances, (µ10)k = (L+ ηk)σ2k, (µ11)k =
(L+η′k)σ
2
k and (σ
2
10)k = 2(L+2ηk)σ
4
k, (σ
2
11)k = 2(L+2η
′
k)σ
4
k for all neighbors k ∈ Nin (honest
and Byzantine agents Gj) according to Lemma 1. It is important to note that for a Gaussian
distribution Y with the mean µ and variance σ2, X = Y−µ
σ2
is a standard normal distribution and
P (Y > y) = P (X > x) = Q(Y−µ
σ2
) = Q(x). (P jFA)
t or Pr(D = H1|H0) may be calculated in
a similar manner given the means and variances, (µ00)k = Lσ2k, (µ01)k = Lσ
2
k + Lh˜
2
k∆
2
kσ
2
k and
(σ200)k = 2Lσ
4
k, (σ
2
01)k = 2(L+ 2Lh˜
2
k∆
2
k)σ
4
k for all k ∈ Nin (honest and Byzantine agents Gj).
It is important to note that one may first establish a desired rate of false alarm by deciding γj
and then determine the detection performance.
It is important to note that the probability of detection indicates the probability that agent Gj
detects the Byzantine attack which is trying to distort performance by persuading the detection
unit that the entire network has reached synchronization or by forcing the honest agent to follow
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the falsified data, and consequently decides against it based on the distribution of the true signal.
Additionally, under (9), the probability of false alarm indicates the probability that Byzantine
neighbors will succeed in coercing agent Gj into mistakenly deciding that the entire multi-agent
network has not reached synchronization when indeed it has, thereby fulfilling its adversarial
objective to move the system from H0 → H1.
Example 2. Consider agent G2 in the event-triggered multi-agent system given in Example 1
with three neighbors. We consider the same underlying communication graph and dynamics for
the entire event-triggered multi-agent system. We assume that G5 is a Byzantine neighbor and
G1 and G4 are honest neighbors for agent G2. We will analyze the transient detection and false
alarm probability distributions for the local test statistic ∧t2 for agent G2’s detection center and
quantify the harmful effects of the Byzantine neighbor G5 on the detection performance. We
consider the same dynamics for the agents and the initial conditions, y1(0) = 3.5, y2(0) =
4, y3(0) = 0.5, y4(0) = 3, y5(0) = 2. The Byzantine agent manipulates its weight to a′5 where,
a′5 = a5 +1. We consider the channel gains h˜1 = 0.92, h˜4 = 0.95, h˜5 = 0.96 and assume σ
2
i = 1
for all the communication links, i = 1, .., 5. We plot the transient performance of the detection
unit for a set of attack strengths ∆1 = 0.8, ∆1 = 0.9, ∆1 = 1, ∆1 = 1.2 and ∆1 = 1.6.
In all cases, we assume the probability of attack P5 = 0.5. Lastly, the detection interval for
the detection unit is L = 15 and λ = 15 where, γj =
∑
k∈N inj Lσ
2
k + λ is chosen based on
the desired false alarm rate (see (9)). Fig. 8 depicts the transient detection performance for
different attack strengths. As seen, the Byzantine neighbor can considerably harm the detection
performance. Similarly, the false alarm rate for the same set-up for when the entire multi-agent
has synchronized (under H0) is shown in Fig. 9. It is clear that the Byzantine neighbor can
considerably increase the false alarm rate by appropriately selecting the attack parameters.
This means that agent G2 will mistakenly continue its communication with its neighbors based
on the false belief that the multi-agent system has not reached synchronized. Similar to the
steady-state analysis of the detection framework, this example shows that the Byzantine agents
can considerably degrade the transient performance of the detection unit.
B. Steady-State Performance Analysis of the Detection Algorithm
Our detection platform is based on Neyman-Pearson theorem. A Neyman-Pearson based
detector measures the signal-to-noise ratio for the unknown signal y over a certain time-interval
37
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Learning Iterations (L=15)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y o
f D
et
ec
tio
n
Probability of Detection Under No Attack
Probability of Detection with Delta=0.8
Probability of Detection with Delta=0.9
Probability of Detection with Delta=1
Probability of Detection with Delta=1.2
Probability of Detection with Delta=1.6
Fig. 8. Probability of Detection (Detection Interval L = 15, Attack Parameters: P5 = 0.5, ∆5 and a′5 = a5 + 1).
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Learning Iterations (L=15)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y o
f F
als
e 
Al
ar
m
Probability of False Alarm Under No Attack
Probability of False Alarm with Delta=0.8
Probability of False Alarm with Delta=0.9
Probability of False Alarm with Delta=1
Probability of False Alarm with Delta=1.2
Probability of False Alarm with Delta=1.6
Fig. 9. Probability of False Alarm (Detection Interval L = 15, Attack Parameters: P5 = 0.5, ∆5 and a′5 = a5 + 1).
38
and detects the presence of the deterministic signal s in y at points, where the signal-to-noise
ratio is maximized. It is known that the Neyman-Pearson theorem provides the optimal decision
criterion, where the likelihood ratio is compared with a threshold γ, previously computed to
minimize a given false alarm probability [55]. The selection of the optimal global threshold γ
is beyond the scope of the work presented here, and we assume that γ in (9) has already been
selected based on some performance and application criteria.
We characterize the steady-state performance of our proposed detection platform performance
by examining its deflection coefficient against intelligent Byzantine attacks. The deflection
coefficient of the test statistic is defined as,
D(∧) = E[∧|H1]− E[∧|H0]
E[(∧ − E[∧|H0])2|H0] , (25)
or the difference of the means (expectations) of the test statistic under the two independent
and identically distributed hypothesis distributions, H0 and H1 (with the same variance), di-
vided by the variance of the test statistic under H0. The deflection coefficient formula given
above can characterize the steady-state performance of the detection framework and analyze
the limitations of the detection procedure by quantifying the distributions under both null and
alternative hypotheses based on the number of Byzantine neighbors and attack parameters. This
quantification can characterize the distance between the expectations of these two hypotheses to
show a limit-case probability of correctly detecting the attacks. Since, the deflection coefficient
is directly related to the area of overlapped regions between two distributions, it can efficiently
characterize the decision performance in a binary hypothesis testing environment [48], [50], [56].
Moreover, the deflection coefficient can be obtained by only calculating the mean and variance
from the observed data set without modeling the exact distributions. There is a direct relationship
between the detection performance and positive values of the deflection coefficient. Given the
event-triggered multi-agent network system design proposed in previous sections and designed
according to Theorem 1, and the proposed detection framework in Section V, here we characterize
the minimum number of Byzantine neighboring agents required to make the detection coefficient
for test statistics equal to zero. First, we characterize the relationship between the number of
Byzantine neighbors of an honest agent and the performance of its detection unit. Second, we
characterize the minimum number of Byzantine agents that can entirely blind the detection unit
of a single honest agent.
39
Theorem 2. Consider an event-triggered multi-agent system designed according to Theorem
1. Consider that each agent Gj (j ∈ 1...N) is equipped with the detection unit proposed in
Section V. For an honest agent with NH honest and NB Byzantine neighbors, the condition for
the detection unit to become entirely blinded or to make the deflection coefficient zero over the
detection interval L is,
NB∑
k=1
LPk[2h˜k∆k(µk − µj) + h˜2k∆2k(σ2k − 1)] =
N∑
k=1
ηkσ
2
k,
where ηk =
∑L
i=1 |h˜ksik−yj(tij)|2
σ2k
, µj = 1L
∑L
i=1 y
i
j and µk =
1
L
∑L
i=1 h˜ky
i
k.
Proof. As mentioned in Section V, each local test statistic Tk over the detection time-interval L
between the honest agent Gj and its neighbor Gk may follow a central or non-central chi-square
distribution. We define, ηk =
∑L
i=1 |h˜kyik−yij |2
σ2k
for an honest communication from agent Gk to the
host agent Gj over the detection interval L. We define, η′k =
∑L
i=1 |h˜k(yik−∆k)−yij |2
σ2k
for a Byzantine
communication from agent Gk to the host agent Gj over the detection interval L. We can see
that, η′k = ηk+
∑L
i=1(h˜
2
k∆
2
k+2h˜k∆ky
i
j−2h˜2k∆kyik)
σ2k
. Further, the true mean (µkj) and variance (σ2kj) under
the null hypothesis H0 and alternative hypothesis H1 for honest communications are as follows,
µkj =
Lσ
2
k Under H0
(L+ ηk)σ
2
k Under H1,
σ2kj =
2Lσ
4
k Under H0
2(L+ 2ηk)σ
4
k Under H1.
Above, ηk ' 0 is implied under H0 or the hypothesis that the two agents have synchronized
according to (9). For the honest agent Gj with N neighbors where, NB of them are Byzantine
and NH of them are honest, we may have,
E[∧|H0] =
NH∑
k=1
Lσ2k +
NB∑
k=1
[Pk(L+ Lh˜
2
k∆
2
k)σ
2
k + (1− Pk)Lσ2k] (26)
E[∧|H1] =
NH∑
k=1
(L+ ηk)σ
2
k +
NB∑
k=1
[Pk((L+ η
′
k)σ
2
k) + (1− Pk)(L+ ηk)σ2k], (27)
E[(∧ − E[∧|H0])2|H0] =
NH∑
k=1
2Lσ4k +
NB∑
k=1
[PkL
2h˜4k∆
4
kσ
4
k − P 2kL2h˜4k∆4kσ4k + 2Lσ4k]. (28)
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Utilizing the above definitions into E[∧|H1]− E[∧|H0] and simplifying further we have,
E[∧|H1]− E[∧|H0] =
NH∑
k=1
ηkσ
2
k +
NB∑
k=1
[Pk[
∑L
i=1(h˜
2
k∆
2
k + 2h˜k∆ky
i
j − 2h˜2k∆kyik)
σ2k
− Lh˜2k∆2k]σ2k + ηkσ2k]
We denote the means of the output signals of agents Gj and Gk over the detection time-interval
L as µj = 1L
∑L
i=1 y
i
j and µk =
1
L
∑L
i=1 h˜ky
i
k. For the Byzantine agents to be able to blind the
detection unit (D(∧) = 0), they need to enforce E[∧|H0] = E[∧|H1]. This means that,
NB∑
k=1
LPk[2h˜k∆k(µk − µj) + h˜2k∆2k(σ2k − 1)] =
N∑
k=1
ηkσ
2
k, (29)
where ηk =
∑L
i=1 |h˜ksik−yj(tij)|2
σ2k
. This quantifies the steady-state effects of the number of neighbor-
ing Byzantine agents, attack strengths and attack probabilities on the detection unit of an honest
agent and also proves the theorem.
If we assume that ∆k = ∆, Pk = P , and h˜k = h˜ for all k = 1, ...NB and ηk = η and
σk = σ for all k = 1, ...N , and quantify the distances between the means of Byzantine agents’
outputs and the honest agent’s output, µk − µj = dk = D for k = 1, ...NB, then the condition
given in Theorem 2 simplifies to NB
N
= ησ
2
LP [2h˜∆D+h˜2∆2(σ2−1)] , where N represents the number
of neighbors for agent Gj . This relation shows that an intelligent Byzantine attack can blind
the entire detection framework by an appropriate selection of P and ∆. This also means that
blinding the detection framework is still possible even in cases that the Byzantine nodes are in
the minority in the neighborhood of the honest agent Gj . Moreover, this reveals the trade-off
that if the Byzantine agents are in the minority in the neighborhood of agent Gj , then they will
need to select larger attack parameters (P and ∆), in order to blind the detection unit, this,
however, in return makes the job of detection easier for the honest agents. For the honest node,
this shows the importance of quick detection of rogue agents. For the Byzantine agents, this
shows the importance of quickly occupying the neighborhood of Gj in order to maintain their
inconspicuous state and fulfill their adversarial objectives. Lastly, this relationship shows the
importance of the distance between the means of outputs of Byzantine agents and the honest
agent. In case of a Byzantine attack, the larger the distances between the means of outputs of
the occupied agents and the mean of the output of the honest agent are, the easier it is for
the Byzantine agents to degrade the performance of the multi-agent systems. In other words,
the Byzantine agents will require to exert less effort (smaller values for ∆ and P ) to blind
the detection unit. This also helps the Byzantine agents to stay hidden. However, the job of
41
selecting attack parameters for Byzantine agents becomes more complicated as the multi-agent
system gets closer to the synchronized state. In other words, this relation also reveals the trade-
off between degrading the performance by the Byzantine attack and the desire to stay hidden
from the detection unit.
Example 3. Consider agent G2 in the event-triggered multi-agent system given in Example 1 with
three neighbors. We consider the same underlying communication graph and initial conditions
for the entire event-triggered multi-agent system. We assume that G4 is a Byzantine neighbor
and G1 and G5 are honest neighbors of agent G2. We consider the following channel gains for
the communication links between agents G2 and its neighbors: h˜1 = 0.8, h˜4 = 0.90, h˜5 = 0.72
and assume σ2i = 1.2 for all the noise in all the communication links i.e. i = 1, ..., 5. The
detection units rely on the detection time-interval L = 20. The deflection coefficient for agent
G2’s detection unit is depicted in Fig. 10. The contour plot (Fig. 11) shows the underneath of
the three-dimensional shaded surface in Fig. 10 and clarifies the relationship amongst the attack
strength parameter ∆4, the attack probability P4 and the deflection coefficient of the detection
unit located on agent G2 i.e. D2(∧). The larger values of ∆4 in general, makes the job of
detection easier, if P4 is kept small enough. For the Byzantine agent to be able to blind the
detection unit, a certain balance between ∆4 and P4 is required. Lastly, Fig 10 shows that it
is possible for a single Byzantine agent to blind the agent G2’s detection unit, even though the
majority of G2’s neighbors are honest nodes. Indeed, the fact that 13 of the G2’s neighborhood
is occupied by a Byzantine agent has severely degraded the detection performance.
Next, we will propose two different learning-based control approaches to mitigate the negative
effects mentioned above, imposed by Byzantine agents on the multi-agent system.
IX. A LEARNING-BASED CONTROL METHOD FOR MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF THE
BYZANTINE ATTACK
A. Distributed Weight Assignments for Mitigating the Effects of Weight Manipulations
In this subsection, we propose a robust distributed weight design that will achieve synchro-
nization and in the case of an attack mitigate the adversarial effects of Byzantine agents. First,
we will deal with the problem of weight manipulation. Common in the literature, it is assumed
that the feedback control framework given in (2) is designed by the agent itself. This will leave
the entire event-triggered multi-agent framework extremely vulnerable to adversarial attempts
42
0
0
0.2
0.4
1
0.6
1
De
fle
cti
on
 C
oe
ffic
ien
t
0.8
0.82
Attack Strength
1
0.6
Attack Propability
1.2
3 0.4
4 0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Fig. 10. Deflection Coefficient for agent G2 in Example 1 as a function of Attack Probability P and Attack Strength ∆.
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Fig. 11. Contour plot of the Deflection Coefficient for agent G2 as a function of Attack Probability P and Attack Strength ∆.
such as node capture or Byzantine attacks as the nodes themselves can independently have a
great influence on the synchronization efforts (in our case, this great influence was quantified
in Subsection VII-C). Here, we propose a synchronization algorithm in which the weights for
the feedback control for agent Gj are assigned by its neighbors Gk, where k ∈ N inj . In other
words, with sending its first information, the neighbor Gk also sends its desired feedback weight
which will be used to initiate the feedback control of agent Gj in order to reach synchronization.
Under this framework, we assume that each agent Gj is aware of its din(j) (defined in Section
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III), similar to before the communication framework is balanced (din(j) = dout(j)) and that each
agent Gj has only authority over designing its own triggering condition by selecting its design
parameter δj —feedback weights are assigned by neighbors. As a result, a Byzantine agent,
instead of being able to diverge the entire behavior of an overtaken agent in the event-triggered
multi-agent network system and consequently mislead the entire multi-agent system, is only able
to partly distract the proper behavior of its neighboring agents. An honest agent will only be
taken over entirely, if the majority of its neighbors are Byzantine. This is highly unlikely in
the presence of a detection framework. This will extremely lighten the burden of the mitigation
process and improve the overall performance.
Theorem 3. Consider the event-triggered multi-agent network system described in Section IV,
where each sub-system Gj is output passive with the output passivity index ρj and is controlled
by the input given in (2). Consider that the feedback weights in (2) for each sub-system Gj are
assigned by its neighbors Gk, where k ∈ N inj . If the underlying connected communication graph
resulting from weight assignments is balanced, the communication time-delays and disturbances
are negligible, and the communication attempts amongst all agents Gj where j = 1, ..., N , are
governed by the triggering conditions,
||ej(t)||22 > δj||yj(t)||22,
where the design parameters δj are chosen such that,
0 < δj ≤
2
|N inj |
(λ(G˜) + ρj)− 1α − 1β
α + β
,
where α > 0 and β > 0 are design variables and λ(G˜) is the connectivity of the underlying
communication graph, then the entire event-triggered multi-agent network system achieves output
synchronization asymptotically.
Proof. Proof is similar to Theorem 1, as we assume that all agents are honest and initiate the
neighbors’ feedback control based on their respective din according to the assumption that the
resulting underlying communication graph is balanced. One can define a modified Laplacian
matrix for the communication graph L˜ = D˜ − A˜, where D˜ is an N ×N diagonal matrix with
d˜j,j = din(j), representing the sum of assigned weights to agent Gj and A˜ is the N×N adjacency
matrix with a˜i,j 6= 0 representing the gain assigned by agent Gi to agent Gj , and a˜i,j = 0 when
there is no communication link between two agents Gi and Gj . Since the communication link
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is balanced (din(j) = dout(j) for ∀j = 1, ..., N ), L˜ = L, similarly, λ(G˜) = λ(G) then one
can simply represent the new framework based on the previous one and show synchronization
for the entire event-triggered multi-agent network system following the same steps presented in
Theorem 1.
Next, we analyze the effects of a Byzantine attack where a Byzantine agent Gk will disturb
the balanced communication graph through weight manipulation by assigning aBk = ak + ωk to
its neighbors, where ωk > 0. For analytical tractability, we do not consider the data falsification
and will show that the new approach will mitigate the negative effects of weight manipulation.
In the next subsection, we will discuss the mitigation process for the data falsification part of the
Byzantine attack. Similar to the previous sections, we assume that amongst the N agents, there
are NB Byzantine nodes with the attack model described in Section VI and NH honest nodes
(NH +NB = N ). NH and NB represent the set of honest and Byzantine agents, respectively. We
represent the honest and Byzantine neighboring agents for Gj byN inHj andN inBj (N inHj ∩N inBj =
∅, N inHj ∪ N inBj = N inj ). |N inj | represents the same cardinality definition as given in Theorem
1. The set of all Byzantine agents is represented by NB and the set of all honest agents is
represented by NH . It is important to note that for the case where the feedback weights are
assigned by the neighbors, the Byzantine neighbor GBk assigns a
B
k = ak + ωk to the feedback
control for agent Gj , otherwise, aHk = ak is assigned. The Lyapunov storage function for the
entire event-triggered multi-agent network system becomes,
S˙ =
N∑
j=1
V˙j ≤
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
ak[(yk(t)− yj(t))− (ek(t)− ej(t))]Tyj(t)
+
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inBj
ωk[(yk(t)− yj(t))− (ek(t)− ej(t))]Tyj(t)−
N∑
j=1
ρjy
T
j (t)yj(t).
It is important to note that ωk = 0 for honest neighbors. First, it can be shown that,
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inBj
ωk(yk(t)− yj(t))Tyj(t) ≤
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inBj
ωky
T
k (t)yk(t)
4
. (30)
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We follow the same approach as before and end up with,
S˙ =
N∑
j=1
V˙j ≤ −Y TLTY + Y TLTE −
N∑
j=1
ρjy
T
j (t)yj(t)
+
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inBj
ωky
T
k (t)yk(t)
4
−
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inBj
ωk[(ek(t)− ej(t))]Tyj(t)
= −Y TLTY + Y TL′TE −
N∑
j=1
ρjy
T
j (t)yj(t) +
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inBj
ωky
T
k (t)yk(t)
4
, (31)
where α and β are the same parameters as given in Theorem 1. We denote, |Wj| as the sum of
the weight manipulations that were assigned to the agent Gj from its Byzantine neighbors. L′
is the Laplacian matrix of the new underlying communication graph consisting of a′k’s and is
defined as,
[L′]j,i =

∑
k∈N inj a
′
k if j = i
−a′k if there is an arc from Gi to Gj with the gain a′k,
where a′k are defined as before. We may follow the same steps as given in Theorem 1, and get
to the following,
S˙ =
N∑
j=1
V˙j ≤ −Y TLTY +
N∑
j=1
(|N inj |+ |Wj|)[
(α + β)δj
2
+
1
2α
]yTj (t)yj(t)
+
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
(ak + ωk)[
yTk (t)yk(t)
2β
]−
N∑
j=1
ρjy
T
j (t)yj(t) +
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inBj
ωky
T
k (t)yk(t)
4
≤ −λ(G)Y TY +
N∑
j=1
(|N inj |+ |Wj|)[
(α + β)δj
2
+
1
2α
]yTj (t)yj(t)
+
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inj
(ak + ωk)[
yTk (t)yk(t)
2β
]−
N∑
j=1
ρjy
T
j (t)yj(t) +
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inBj
ωky
T
k (t)yk(t)
4
, (32)
We introduce the same square diagonal matrix Θ ∈ RN×N , where,
[Θ]j,i =
+λ(G) + ρj − |N
in
j |[ (α+β)δj2 + 12α + 12β ] if j = i
0 otherwise.
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Given (32) and Θ, we have,
S˙ ≤ −Y T∆ ΘY∆ +
N∑
j=1
|Wj|[ (α + β)δj
2
+
1
2α
]yTj (t)yj(t) +
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inBj
ωk(
1
4
+
1
2β
)yTk (t)yk(t).
(33)
Given the assumption that the multi-agent system was initially designed according to Theorem
1, we have Θ > 0. After simplifying, and given S˙ → 0 as t→∞, we have,
0 < Y T∆ ΘY∆ ≤
N∑
j=1
|Wj|[ (α + β)δj
2
+
1
2α
]yTj (t)yj(t) +
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inBj
ωk(
1
4
+
1
2β
)yTk (t)yk(t).
(34)
Comparing (34) with (19), one can see that assignments of the agents’ weights by their neighbors
can greatly decrease the magnitude of the upper-bound on the deviations from the synchronized
state. Additionally, by not allowing the Byzantine agents design their own weights, we are
diversifying the negative effects caused by the weight manipulations. We are dividing the weight
manipulation attack into two parts. One part is still related to the Byzantine agents and their
outputs and cannot be mitigated without a direct access to the corrupt agents (second part
of the summation given in (34)). The first part of the upper-bound shown in (34), however,
may be mitigated by the honest agents given their passivity indices and their design of the
triggering conditions. This greatly helps with the synchronization process and lowers the upper-
bound of the deviations. Moreover, if a Byzantine agent only has honest neighbors, through this
mitigation process, the output of the Byzantine agent will eventually reach synchronization as the
information and weights received by the Byzantine agent from its honest neighbors will follow
the requirements given in Theorem 3. Consequently, the honest agents will be able to entirely
mitigate the negative effects of weight manipulations –This will be illustrated in Example 4.
This combined with the detection framework presented in the next section for dealing with data
falsifications, can completely eradicate the negative effects of the Byzantine attack. We will
explain this in more details next.
Mitigating the effects of Weight Manipulation by utilizing the Passivity Properties of
Agents: As it was characterized before passivity can ameliorate the effects of a Byzantine
attack. For all agents Gj where j = 1, ..., N , we can represent the passivity indices with, ρj =
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ρ′j + ρ
∆
j > 0, where ρ
′
j > 0 and ρ
∆
j > 0. We assume that the triggering conditions are designed
according to Theorem 3, where,
0 < δj ≤
2
|N inj |
(λ(G˜) + ρj)− 1α − 1β
α + β
,
Simplifying this relation based on ρj , and annotating ρ′j = λ(G)− |N inj |[ (α+β)δj2 + 12α + 12β ], we
may have, ρj − ρ∆j = ρ′j . As a result, if the triggering conditions are designed such that,
ρ∆j >
∑
k∈N inBj
ωk[
(α + β)δj
2
+
1
2α
],
where ωk’s are weight manipulations caused by the Byzantine neighbors, then the effects of
weight manipulations committed by the Byzantine agents are assuaged. To extrapolate this result
to the entire event-triggered multi-agent system, we assume that the triggering conditions are
designed such that the above relation holds for each agent, we introduce the positive definite
diagonal N ×N matrix Θ∆ ∈ RN×N , where,
[Θ∆]j,i =

ρ∆j −
∑
k∈N inBj
ωk[
(α+β)δj
2
+ 1
2α
] > 0 if j = i
0 otherwise.
As a result, (34) becomes,
0 < Y T∆ ΘY∆ ≤ −Y TΘ∆Y +
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inBj
ωk(
1
4
+
1
2β
)yTk (t)yk(t). (35)
Defining the positive definite matrix Θ′ = Θ + Θ∆, and simplifying further we have,
0 < Y T∆ Θ
′Y∆ ≤
N∑
j=1
∑
k∈N inBj
ωk(
1
4
+
1
2β
)yTk (t)yk(t). (36)
By comparing (36) with (34) and consequently (18), one can see that the new method of
distributed weight assignments in conjunction with the utilization of the passivity qualities of
sub-systems can greatly mitigate the effects of a Byzantine attack’s weight manipulations. It is
important to note that by giving the authority to the honest agents to be able to adjust their
triggering conditions according to their assessment of the magnitude of weight manipulations
committed by their neighboring Byzantine agents, one can entirely mitigate this part of the
Byzantine attack. This is done based on the fact that the honest agent Gj is aware of its din(j)
and can estimate the weight manipulations by observing the difference between its din(j) and
the actual weights assigned to Gj by its neighbors. Moreover, by decreasing the magnitude
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of the design variable δj (shortening the triggering intervals - increasing the communication
rate), Gj may increase ρ∆j and compensate for the negative effects of weight manipulations.
This will entirely eradicate the negative effects of weight manipulations committed by isolated
Byzantine agents (with no Byzantine neighbors). However, in order to mitigate the negative
effects of weight manipulations in cases where the Byzantine agents have Byzantine neighbors
will require further attention. The mitigation method offered in the next section combined with
the detection framework will attempt to further mitigate these negative effects. Lastly, one can
initiate the design of the event-triggered multi-agent system by selecting smaller values for δj ,
j = 1, ..., N (a more conservative event-triggered design). This will generally result in a more
resilient event-triggered multi-agent network system against Byzantine attacks.
Example 4. We consider an event-triggered multi-agent network system consisting of four agents
(i = 1, ..., 4) with the underlying balanced communication topology given in Fig. 12. We assume
the following dynamics for agents,
Gi =
x˙i(t) = −cixi(t) + ui(t)yi(t) = xi(t),
with c1 = 1.2, c2 = 1.8, c3 = 2.6, c4 = 0.80 and initial conditions, y1(0) = 2, y2(0) =
−10, y3(0) = 1, and y4(0) = −2. One can verify that all agents are dissipative with the
storage function Vi(x) = 12x
T
i (t)xi(t). This results in output passivity indices ρ1 = 1.2, ρ2 =
1.8, ρ3 = 2.6, ρ4 = 0.8 for the agents. The Laplacian matrix of the underlying communication
graph amongst agents before Byzantine attack is balances as follows,
L =

1 −1 0 0
0 2 −2 0
0 0 2 −2
−1 −1 0 2
 .
with the connectivity measure, λ(G) = 2. We assume that the event-triggered multi-agent network
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Fig. 12. The Underlying Communication Graph for the Multi-Agent System Presented in Example 4 (Attack Parameters:
ω2 = 2.5 and ω4 = 2).
system is designed based on Theorem 3 with the following triggering conditions,
||e1(t)||22 > 0.80||y1(t)||22,
||e2(t)||22 > 0.64||y2(t)||22,
||e3(t)||22 > 0.60||y3(t)||22,
||e4(t)||22 > 0.35||y4(t)||22,
by selecting αi = 1, βi = 1 for i = 1, ..., 4. We assume G2 and G4 are Byzantine agents and
instead of assigning correct weights a2 = 1 and a4 = 2 to agents G1 and G3, they assign a2 +ω2
and a4 + ω4 to agents G1 and G3 where ω2 = 2.5 and ω4 = 2. At time t = 0.4s, in order to
mitigate the attack, honest agents G1 and G3 increase ρ∆1 and ρ
∆
3 , and their communication rate
by shortening their triggering intervals. They alter their triggering parameters from δ1 = 0.80
and δ3 = 0.60 to δ1 = 0.40 and δ3 = 0.15. Fig.13 shows that the system synchronizes as a
consequence of this mitigation attempt. One can see clearly in Fig.13 that due to the Byzantine
attack the agents diverge at first and it is only after the honest agents mitigate the attack by
following the steps given in Sub-Section IX-A that the multi-agent system takes some corrective
steps and eventually synchronizes.
B. A Learning-Based Distributed Algorithm for Mitigating the Effects of Data Falsification
Identifying the Byzantine Agents: Here, we propose an algorithm based on which each
agent Gj is able to identify each of its neighbors Gk, where k ∈ N inj as an honest or Byzantine
neighbor. The identification of each neighboring agent is done in order to realize whether the
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Fig. 13. The Outputs of the Multi-Agent System in the Presence of Weight-Manipulation Byzantine Attack (Attack Parameters:
ω2 = 2.5 and ω4 = 2) after the Mitigation Process.
receiving information is trustworthy or not. This is necessary for the next step of the mitigation
process. We already know that based on a sufficiently large number of detection data-points of
length L coming from the neighbor agent Gk, one can postulate that if the neighbor agent Gk
is honest, then the data points will follow a normal distribution conditioned on the hypothesis
Hi(i = 0, 1), namely fPDF (Tk|Hi) = N ((µi0)k, (σ2i0)k) where i = 0, 1 and k ∈ N inj . The exact
form of (µi0)k and (σ2i0)k are given in (20), (21), (22) and (23), and the test statistics Tk is defined
in Sub-section VIII-A. fPDF (Tk|Hi) is the probability density function (PDF) of test statistics
under each hypothesis Hi, i = 0, 1. Similarly, if the neighbor agent Gk is Byzantine, then the
data coming from this neighbor is a Gaussian mixture from N ((µi0)k, (σ2i0)k) with the probability
of 1 − Pk and N ((µi1)k, (σ2i1)k) with the probability of Pk, where i = 0, 1 and k ∈ N inj . As a
result, the decision making process will be based on a hypothesis testing framework, where it
is decided that the neighboring agent Gk is honest under the hypothesis Hi, i.e. (Decik)0, if the
receiving data can be justified by the Gaussian distribution expected under the hypothesis Hi.
Otherwise, if a Gaussian mixture justifies the data points better, (Decik)1 under the hypothesis
i is decided. This means that it is decided that Gk is Byzantine, if the receiving data from Gk
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follows the distribution of the expected Gaussian mixture under the hypothesis Hi. This decision
may be made using the maximum likelihood decision rule [47],
fPDF (Tk|(Decik)0)
fPDF (Tk|(Decik)1)
≷HB 1. (37)
However, these distributions are unknown to the honest agents and the detection unit should learn
these distributions’ respective parameters. Next, we will cover the estimation process based on
the proposed framework.
Learning the Distributions’ Parameters: The parameters in (37) are unknown and should
be estimated. The formulation given in (37) is parametric and consequently, the framework
may be looked at as a parametric statistical estimation problem [47]. Accordingly, under the
hypothesis Hi(i = 0, 1), for the honest neighboring agents Gk where k ∈ N inHj , the parameters
to be estimated are θ0 = ((µi0)k, (σ2i0)k) and for the Byzantine neighboring agents Gk where
k ∈ N inBj , the parameters to be estimated are the ones in the set θ0 and θ1 = ((µi1)k, (σ2i1)k, Pk).
Here, we propose a learning-based algorithm for estimating the parameter sets θ0 and θ1. We
annotate the estimation of the means and variances as, (µ˜i0)k, (µ˜i1)k, (σ˜2i0)k, (σ˜
2
i1)k, and P˜k for
Hi(i = 0, 1) and k ∈ N inHj or k ∈ N inBj . Let us assume a detection time-interval of length
L where, the time-interval includes L triggering instances that may be utilized as the sample
points for the estimation [57]. For example, between neighboring agents Gj and Gk at the discrete
time-instance i, the test statistics attained by agent Gj in regard to the neighbor Gk becomes
tik =
∑i
n=i−L |ynk − ynj |2, and the L number of samples ynk and ynj depend on the most recent
outputs of the respective event-detectors at the time-instance n during the detection interval L.
In order to estimate the parameters in the set θ0 for the case of honest agents under the
hypotheses H0 and H1, we can simply utilize the method of moments [47]. For the honest
neighbors, we know that the data should preferably follow a normal distribution with the means
and variences given in (20), (21), (22) and (23). We assume the learning iterations of length Lp
(each learning iteration consists of Lp data points). Each learning iteration may consist of one or
two sets of data belonging to the hypothesis H0 and H1, respectively. At the learning iteration
l, we may have T (l)k = [(t
1
k)
0, (t2k)
0, ..., (tL0k )
0, (t1k)
1, (t2k)
1, ..., (tL1k )
1], where L0 +L1 = Lp. Given
Li (i = 0, 1) data points, for a normal distribution and for the learning iteration l with Lp total
number of data points, the first and second moments theoretically may be represented as,
(m1)
i
k =
1
Li
Li∑
j=1
tjk,
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and,
(m2)
i
k =
1
Li
Li∑
j=1
tjk
2
,
for Hi(i = 0, 1) and k ∈ N inHj . Consequently, (m1)ik = (µ˜i0)k is the estimator for the sample
mean for Hi(i = 0, 1) and k ∈ N inHj at the learning iteration l. And for the variances, we have,
(σ˜2i0)k + (µ˜i0)
2
k = (m2)
i
k for Hi(i = 0, 1) with k ∈ N inHj . As a result, we may have,
(σ˜2i0)k =
1
Li
Li∑
j=1
tjk
2 − ( 1
Li
Li∑
j=1
tjk)
2 =
1
Li
Li∑
j=1
(tjk − (µ˜i0)k)2,
for Hi(i = 0, 1) and k ∈ N inHj . To sum up, the learned parameter set θ0 at the learning iteration
l for an honest communication between two honest agents becomes,
θ˜0 = ((µ˜i0)k, (σ˜
2
i0)k) = (
1
Li
Li∑
j=1
tjk,
1
Li
Li∑
j=1
(tjk − (µ˜i0)k)2), (38)
for Hi(i = 0, 1) and k ∈ N inHj .
Next, we define the the complete learning process for an honest neighboring agent based on the
above estimators. Each learning phase consists of Lp detection time-intervals of length L (where
the parameters are estimated as above) or Lp × L data points. One can recall from Sub-Section
V-A that each agent is consistently deciding whether the system has reached synchronization
(Decisionsyn), i.e. H0 is the correct hypothesis, or otherwise, i.e. H1 is the correct hypothesis.
As a result, each data point li after the detection time-interval of length L under the set of
the Lp data points comes with an index indicating if the estimation is happening under the
hypothesis H0 or H1. We annotated the number of these estimation as Li given the hypothesis
Hi (i = 0, 1). Needless to say L0 + L1 = Lp. As an application related side-note, one can set
a required lower-bound for the number of data points under hypothesis Hi (i = 0, 1) before the
estimation (learning process) for the parameters under the hypothesis starts. For instance, one
can require, L1 ≥ τ1, before the learning process starts for the parameters under H1. For the
learning process that starts at time li + 1 respectively for (i = 0, 1) and when the next Lp data
points are available, we already have, (µ˜0)k = [(µ˜00)0k, ..., (µ˜00)
l0
k ], (σ˜
2
0)k = [(σ˜
2
00)
0
k, ..., (σ˜
2
00)
l0
k ]
and similarly, (µ˜1)k = [(µ˜10)0k, ..., (µ˜10)
l1
k ], (σ˜
2
1)k = [(σ˜
2
10)
0
k, ..., (σ˜
2
10)
l1
k ]. We can define our so-far
estimates as (µ˜00)k(l0) =
∑l0
j=1(µ˜00)
j
k
l0
, (µ˜10)k(l1) =
∑l1
j=1(µ˜10)
j
k
l1
as the (current) estimate for the
means under each hypothesis and (σ˜200)k(l
0) =
∑l0
j=1(σ˜
2
00)
j
k
l0
and (σ˜210)k(l
1) =
∑l1
j=1(σ˜
2
10)
j
k
l1
as the
current estimates for the variances under each hypothesis. These values also play the rule of the
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initial points for the next learning iteration. As a result, in a recursive manner, the next learned
values at li + 1 for the means may be determined as follows,
(µ˜00)k(l
0 + 1) =
l0
l0 + 1
(µ˜00)k(l
0) +
1
(l0 + 1)L0
L0∑
i=1
(tik)
0, (39)
(µ˜10)k(l
1 + 1) =
l1
l1 + 1
(µ˜10)k(l
1) +
1
(l1 + 1)L1
L1∑
i=1
(tik)
1, (40)
where (tik)
0 and (tik)
1 respectively represent the next set of test statistic data points received
under the hypothesis H0 or H1 for the next learning interval l = 1, ..., Lp from agent Gk. This
recursive algorithm will require the estimation framework to only record the true values of the
last l0 or l1 estimates respectively in a queue, and by calculating the new estimate at li + 1, the
first element of the respective queue may be discarded and the new estimate may be added to
the queue. This means that the learning process will make use of li ×Lp ×L data points while
only storing li data points for each hypothesis Hi (i = 0, 1), respectively. Similarly, the process
for learning the variances becomes,
(σ˜200)k(l
0 + 1) =
l0
l0 + 1
[(σ˜200)k(l
0)] +
1
(l0 + 1)L0
L0∑
i=1
((tik)
0 − (µ˜00)k(l0 + 1))2, (41)
(σ˜210)k(l
1 + 1) =
l1
l1 + 1
[(σ˜210)k(l
1)] +
1
(l1 + 1)L1
L1∑
i=1
((tik)
1 − (µ˜10)k(l1 + 1))2, (42)
where (tik)
0 and (tik)
1 respectively represent the next set of test statistic data points received
under the hypothesis H0 or H1 for the next learning interval l = 1, ..., Lp from agent Gk.
Lastly, as mentioned, as a design matter, one can put performance criteria such as L0 > τ1 and
L1 > τ2 as quantities to be met first before the learning process for each of parameter sets
under each hypothesis starts in order to make sure that the learning data-set is large enough for
a more precise estimation. This two-level estimation process, will achieve a very good learning-
based estimates while maintaining low memory requirements, as only the values of the last li
estimates (containing the information for L × Lp data points) and their respective hypothesis
keys are required to be memorized in a feedback, recursive manner.
For Byzantine agents, we take another common approach, previously utilized in control
literature [58], [59], called maximum liklihood method (MLE) of parameter estimation. This
is due to the fact that additional to the means and variances of the Byzantine data, one needs to
also estimate the latent variable Pk (k ∈ N inBj ) or the probability of the attack. MLE, developed
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by Fisher [60], has many desirable theoretical properties, such as consistency, efficiency and
unbiasedness under certain conditions [47]. The likelihood is the joint probability of a set of
observations, conditioned on a choice for the parameters θ˜1, Lik(θ˜1, y) = P (y|θ˜1), where y
represents the data sample points, θ˜1 is the set of parameters to be estimated, and P is the
probability distribution. According to this relation, the parameter set (θ˜MLE1 ) that maximizes
the likelihood of the observed data gives the best estimator. This value is called the maximum
likelihood estimate (MLE),
θ˜MLE1 = argmaxθ˜1 Lik(θ˜1, y).
Each learning phase t consists of Lp data-points. We denote the test statistic between the
agent Gj and the Byzantine neighbor Gk during the learning phase of length Lp as, T
(t)
k =
[(t1k)
0, (t2k)
0, ..., (tL0k )
0, (t1k)
1, (t2k)
1, ..., (tL1k )
1]. Similar to before L0 + L1 = Lp. Additionally,
similar to before, one can start the learning process for each set of parameters under each
hypothesis Hi (i = 0, 1), once L0 > τ1 and L1 > τ2. We utilize the estimates resulting
from each learning phase as initial values for the next round of estimations. Additionally, we
utilize the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm for the learning process. The Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm is an iterative learning-based method for finding θ˜MLE1 [47]. The
EM algorithm alternates between two steps, an expectation step which calculates the expectation
of the log-likelihood given the current estimates for the parameters, and a maximization step
which computes the parameters that maximize the expected log-likelihood found in the first step
—This step involves derivations with respect to unknown parameters (means and variances) and
substitutions for the latent parameter set Z. These new values then initialize the next expectation
step. We annotate the latent parameters as Z = [z0, z1] (in our case, the latent variables represent
the attack probabilities for the Byzantine agent Gk, i.e. P˜k and 1−P˜k). For Byzantine neighboring
agent Gk, we have,
Lik(θ˜1, y) = Lik((µ˜ij)k, (σ˜
2
ij)k;Tk, Z) = p(Tk, Z|(µ˜ij)k, (σ˜2ij)k),
where Tk represents our data points, p(.) is the joint PDF of the data points and latent variables
conditioned on the parameters and j = 0, 1. Further, we can describe the above based on a
marginal and a conditional distribution, this gives us,
p(Tk, Z|(µ˜ij)k, (σ˜2ij)k) = p(zj|Tk, (µ˜ij)k, (σ˜2ij)k)p(Tk|(µ˜ij)k, (σ˜2ij)k) = pijkp(Tk|(µ˜ij)k, (σ˜2ij)k),
(43)
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where 0 ≤ pijk ≤ 1 represents the distribution for the latent variable which is the probability
of attack for the Byzantine agent Gk. Also, j = 0, 1 and pi0k + pi
1
k = 1. To sum all this up, for
estimating the Byzantine parameters of agent Gk, and in order to describe the above relationship
based on single data points, we expand (43) to have,
Lik((µ˜ij)k, (σ˜
2
ij)k;Tk, Z) = p(Tk, Z|(µ˜ij)k, (σ˜2ij)k) =
Lp∏
n=1
1∏
j=0
pijkp(t
n
k)
i|(µ˜ij)k, (σ˜2ij)k). (44)
Under the EM algorithm, for the first step, the expectation is calculated based on the log-
likelihood function of the distributions. Given (44), the expectation step (Q-function) based on
the current estimate set θ˜(l)1 , for agent Gk under the hypotheses Hi (i = 0, 1), becomes,
Q(θ˜1|θ˜(l)1 ) = Ez|Tk;θ˜(l)1 [logLik((µ˜ij)k, (σ˜
2
ij)k;Tk, Z)]
= E
z|Tk;θ˜(l)1
[log p(Tk, Z|θ˜1)|Tk, θ˜(l)1 ]
=
L0∑
n=1
log[
1∑
j=0
pijkp((t
n
k)
0|(µ˜0j)k, (σ˜20j)k)p(zj|(tnk)0, (µ˜0j)(l)k , (σ˜20j)(l)k ]
+
L1∑
n=1
log[
1∑
j=0
pijkp((t
n
k)
1|(µ˜1j)k, (σ˜21j)k)p(zj|(tnk)1, (µ˜1j)(l)k , (σ˜21j)(l)k ], (45)
where θ˜(l)1 = ((µ˜0j)k, (σ˜
2
0j)k, (µ˜1j)k, (σ˜
2
1j)k, pi
j
k) for j = 0, 1, are the current estimates for the
neighboring Byzantine neighbor Gk. It is also well-known in the literature that given the current
estimate θ(l)1 , the conditional distribution of Z, i.e. p(zj|(tnk)r, (µ˜rj)(l)k , (σ˜2rj)(l)k ), under hypothesis
Hr, (r = 0, 1) respectively, for each summation in (45). is determined by Bayes’ Theorem as,
p(zj|(tnk)r, (µ˜rj)(l)k , (σ˜2rj)(l)k ) =
(pijk)
(l)p((tnk)
r|(µ˜rj)(l)k , (σ˜2rj)(l)k )∑1
s=0(pi
s
k)
(l)p((tnk)
r|(µ˜rs)(l)k , (σ˜2rs)(l)k )
. (46)
For the maximization step, we should maximize Q(θ˜1|θ˜(l)1 ), by taking derivatives with respect
to the parameters, i.e. θ˜(l+1)1 = arg maxθ˜1 Q(θ˜1|θ˜
(l)
1 ). Simplifying further, and utilizing Jensen’s
inequality and given the fact that log likelihood is a concave function [47], we have,
θ˜
(l+1)
1 = arg maxθ˜1 Q(θ˜1|θ˜
(l)
1 )
≡ arg maxθ˜1 [
L0∑
n=1
1∑
j=0
[p(zj|(tnk)0, (µ˜0j)(l)k , (σ˜20j)(l)k )(log pijk −
((tnk)
0 − (µ˜0j)k)2
2(σ˜20j)k
− log(σ˜
2
0j)k
2
)]
+
L1∑
n=1
1∑
j=0
[p(zj|(tnk)1, (µ˜1j)(l)k , (σ˜21j)(l)k )(log pijk −
((tnk)
1 − (µ˜1j)k)2
2(σ˜21j)k
− log(σ˜
2
1j)k
2
)]]. (47)
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This should be done subject to the constraint that
∑1
j=0 pi
j
k = 1 for the Byzantine agent
Gk. Similar to common approaches in literature in regard to EM-based estimation of Gaussian
mixtures [61], we utilize a Lagrangian multiplier for maximization, hence we have,
maxJ = Q(θ˜1|θ˜(l)1 ) + λ(
1∑
j=0
pijk − 1)
≡ max[
L0∑
n=1
1∑
j=0
[p(zj|(tnk)0, (µ˜0j)(l)k , (σ˜20j)(l)k )(log pijk −
((tnk)
0 − (µ˜0j)k)2
2(σ˜20j)k
− log(σ˜
2
0j)k
2
)]
+
L1∑
n=1
1∑
j=0
[p(zj|(tnk)1, (µ˜1j)(l)k , (σ˜21j)(l)k )(log pijk −
((tnk)
1 − (µ˜1j)k)2
2(σ˜21j)k
− log(σ˜
2
1j)k
2
)]
+ λ(
1∑
j=0
pijk − 1)]. (48)
In order to maximize the above, one should solve for the equations resulting from the derivative
of each parameter by equating them with zero. As an example, we have (for j = 0, 1),
d
dpijk
J = λ+
∑L0
n=1 p(zj|(tnk)0, (µ˜0j)(l)k , (σ˜20j)(l)k )
pijk
+
∑L1
n=1 p(zj|(tnk)1, (µ˜1j)(l)k , (σ˜21j)(l)k )
pijk
= 0, (49)
which gives us,
−pijkλ =
L0∑
n=1
p(zj|(tnk)0, (µ˜0j)(l)k , (σ˜20j)(l)k ) +
L1∑
n=1
p(zj|(tnk)1, (µ˜1j)(l)k , (σ˜21j)(l)k ), (50)
or −pijkλ = (L0 + L1)pijk. And we have, λ = −Lp. In a similar manner, we can take derivatives
and simplify further to find the following recursive estimations for the Byzantine parameters for
agent Gk,
(pijk)
(l+1) =
∑L0
n=1 p(zj|(tnk)0, (µ˜0j)(l)k , (σ˜20j)(l)k ) +
∑L1
l=1 p(zj|(tnk)1, (µ˜1j)(l)k , (σ˜21j)(l)k )
Lp
, (51)
(µ˜0j)
(l+1)
k =
∑L0
n=1 p(zj|(tnk)0, (µ˜0j)(l)k , (σ˜20j)(l)k )(tnk)0∑L0
n=1 p(zj|(tnk)0, (µ˜0j)(l)k , (σ˜20j)(l)k )
, (52)
(σ˜20j)
(l+1)
k =
∑L0
n=1 p(zj|(tnk)0, (µ˜0j)(l)k , (σ˜20j)(l)k )((tnk)0 − (µ˜0j)(l+1)k )2∑L0
n=1 p(zj|(tnk)0, (µ˜0j)(l)k , (σ˜20j)(l)k )
, (53)
(µ˜1j)
(l+1)
k =
∑L1
n=1 p(zj|(tnk)1, (µ˜1j)(l)k , (σ˜21j)(l)k )(tnk)1∑L1
n=1 p(zj|(tnk)1, (µ˜1j)(l)k , (σ˜21j)(l)k )
, (54)
(σ˜21j)
(l+1)
k =
∑L1
n=1 p(zj|(tnk)1, (µ˜1j)(l)k , (σ˜21j)(l)k )((tnk)1 − (µ˜1j)(l+1)k )2∑L1
n=1 p(zj|(tnk)1, (µ˜1j)(l)k , (σ˜21j)(l)k )
. (55)
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Similar to the previous algorithm, one can design independent performance criteria such as
L0 > τ1 and L1 > τ2 as quantities to be met first before the learning process for each of the
parameter sets starts. This is to make sure that the learning data-set is large enough for a precise
estimation. The algorithm may be solved recursively. At discrete time instance l when enough
information is received the recursive learning algorithm starts and the estimates at the end of
each expectation-maximization run may be used as initial values for the next learning iteration
l + 1 that uses a new set of Lp data points. After the learning process has ended, the honest
agent may classify its neighbor Gk as a Byzantine or honest agent following the likelihood-based
hypothesis testing,
f˜PDF (Tk|(Decik)0)
f˜PDF (Tk|(Decik)1)
≷HB 1,
where f˜PDF (.) represents the probability distribution function attained based on the best estimates
of the parameters available to the agent.
Mitigating the Effects of Data Falsification: Once the Byzantine agents are identified
based on the above algorithm. One can utilize this information to mitigate the effects of the
attack. Unlike most approaches in the literature that rely on excluding the Byzantine agents,
we utilize the Byzantine information against rogue agents in order to benefit the entire event-
triggered multi-agent system. As the first step, for the decision making step, we define a new local
summary statistic based on the information received from only the honest agents, i.e. (T ?j )
H =∑
k∈N inHj
T jk . Similar to before, each agent will make its own decision on the synchronization
hypothesis using the predefined threshold γHj ,
Decisionsyn =
H0 if (T
∗
j )
H < γHj
H1 otherwise.
Under the hypothesis H0, at the learning iteration l + 1, the honest agent would estimate the
means ((µ˜00)
(l+1)
k and (µ˜01)
(l+1)
k ) based on the received information from the Byzantine neighbor
Gk or estimate only (µ˜00)
(l+1)
k based on the received information from the honest neighbor Gk
according to the algorithm given in the previous sub-section. These estimates follow the form
given in (20). As a result, the honest agent may closely estimate the attack parameter ∆˜l+1k after
each learning iteration for the Byzantine neighbor Gk as follows,
∆˜l+1k ≈
√
(µ˜01)
(l+1)
k − (µ˜00)(l+1)k
Lσ˜2kh˜
2
k
. (56)
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In a similar manner, under the hypothesis H1, an analogous estimation process may be
undertaken by the honest agent. Here, it is important to note that,
(µ˜11)
(l+1)
k − (µ˜10)(l+1)k = Lh˜2k∆2k + 2Lh˜k∆k(µj − µ˜k), (57)
where µj = 1L
∑L
i=1 y
i
j . Since µk is not available to us, it is prudent to use the estimation
µ˜k =
1
L
∑L
i=1 µ
i where µi = 1|N in|
∑
k∈N in y
i
k at time-instance i during the detection interval
of length L. µ˜k can provide us with a good initial value as it represent the general state the
entire multi-agent system is at. Later, at the learning iteration l + 1, one can replace µk with
1
L
∑L
i=1(y˜
i
k − ∆˜lk). Based on (57), we also have,
h˜k∆
2
k + 2∆k(µj − µ˜k) = (
√
h˜k∆k +
(µj − µ˜k)√
h˜k
)2 − (µj − µ˜k)
2
h˜k
. (58)
Finally, by utilizing (57) and (58), we have,
∆˜l+1k ≈
1√
h˜k
(
√
(µ˜11)
(l+1)
k − (µ˜10)(l+1)k
Lh˜k
+
(µj − µ˜k)2
h˜k
− (µj − µ˜k)√
h˜k
). (59)
In the above relations, we have assumed that σ˜k and h˜k for the communication links are
available to the agents. As mentioned before, these assumptions are justified by the fact that
each detection unit can perform simple noise power estimation and channel gain estimation
(by averaging the signal-to-noise ratio over a certain time interval) between consecutive sensing
intervals to accurately obtain these values. Finally, instead of excluding the Byzantine agent Gk
in the process of mitigating the attack, one can utilize the false information after the estimation
and mitigate the negative adversarial effects after the learning iteration l + 1 by replacing the
Byzantine agent’s output information with y˜k = yk ∓ ∆˜l+1k under the hypothesis Hi (i = 0, 1),
respectively. Next, we will demonstrate our approach with an example.
Example 5. We consider a multi-agent event-triggered network system consisting of four agents
(i = 1, ..., 4) with the underlying balanced communication topology given in Fig. 14. We assume
the following dynamics for agents,
Gi =
x˙i(t) = −cixi(t) + ui(t)yi(t) = xi(t),
with c1 = 1.2, c2 = 2.2, c3 = 2.4, c4 = 0.60 and initial conditions, y1(0) = 5, y2(0) = 10, y3(0) =
4, y4(0) = 1. One can verify that all agents are dissipative with the storage function Vi(x) =
1
2
xTi (t)xi(t). This results in output passivity indices ρ1 = 1.2, ρ2 = 2.2, ρ3 = 2.4, ρ4 = 0.6.
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The Laplacian matrix of the underlying communication graph amongst agents before Byzantine
attack is balances as follows,
L =

1 0 −1 0
0 1 −1 0
−1 0 2 −1
0 −1 0 1
 .
with the connectivity measure, λ(G) = 2. We assume that the multi-agent network system is
designed based on Theorem 3 with the following triggering conditions,
||e1(t)||22 > 0.21||y1(t)||22,
||e2(t)||22 > 0.14||y2(t)||22,
||e3(t)||22 > 0.20||y3(t)||22,
||e4(t)||22 > 0.45||y4(t)||22,
An additive Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance σ2k = 1.22 (N (0, σ2k)) is assumed in
the communication links. The channel gains are h˜k = 1 for k = 1, ..., 4. We assume G1 is a
Byzantine agent. Under the hypothesis H0, at time t = 3s, G1 attacks the network with the
attack parameters P1 = 0.70 and ∆1 = 8. One can see that the behavior of the multi-agent
system drastically deviates from its desired synchronized behavior as a result of the attack (Fig.
15 and Fig. 16). The honest agent G3 detects the Byzantine agent and starts the process of
learning the Byzantine agent’s behavior using the proposed mitigation algorithm. The learning
parameters are L = 12 with 20 learning iterations (l = 20) of length 20 (Lp = 20) which takes
advantage of an overall of 400 data points. At time t = 6s, the honest agent G3 estimates the
attack parameters as P˜1 = 0.68 (Fig. 17) and ∆˜1 = 6.35 using the proposed algorithm given in
the previous sub-section and the relation given below,
∆˜l+11 ≈
1√
h˜1
(
√
(µ˜11)
(l+1)
1 − (µ˜10)(l+1)1
Lh˜1
+
(µ3 − µ˜1)2
h˜1
− (µ3 − µ˜1)√
h˜1
).
The estimations at each learning iteration are given in Fig 17, Fig 18 and Fig 19. The mitigation
process starts at time t = 8 where the information received from agent G1 by agent G3 is replaced
with y˜1 = y1 − ∆˜l+11 . One can see the positive effects of this mitigation process in Fig. 15 and
Fig. 16 toward the end of the experiment where the multi-agent system enhances its performance
and reaches synchronization again.
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Fig. 14. The Underlying Communication Graph for the Multi-Agent System Presented in Example 5.
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Fig. 15. The Outputs of the Multi-Agent System in the Presence of the Byzantine Attack (Attack Parameters: P1 = 0.70 and
∆1 = 8).
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Fig. 16. The Deviations of the Outputs from the Synchronized State of the Multi-Agent System in the Presence of the Byzantine
Attack (Attack Parameters: P1 = 0.70 and ∆1 = 8).
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Fig. 17. The Estimated Probability of Attack Using the Proposed Algorithm.
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Fig. 18. The Estimated Mean (µ˜00)
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1 , under H0 Using the Proposed Algorithm.
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Fig. 19. The Estimated Mean (µ˜01)
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1 , under H1 Using the Proposed Algorithm..
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X. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The work presented in this paper may be divided into two parts. The first part consists of
a comprehensive event-triggered control design proposal that can guarantee synchronization for
a network of multi-agent systems based on their passivity properties. This proposed control
design is capable of reducing the communication load amongst sub-agents while maintaining
synchronization and desired performance criteria. Under this part of the work, we also show
the lack of Zeno behavior for the event-triggered conditions. The second part of our work
concerns security. Under this section, we introduced a general powerful model for Byzantine
attacks containing both data falsification and weight manipulation. Additionally, we introduced
a detection framework, through which, the honest agents will attempt to detect and mitigate the
effects of the attack. We gave a full performance analysis of the detection unit based on both
transient and steady-state characteristics of the framework. Lastly, we presented two learning-
based mitigation processes. The first one was based on the passivity properties of the agents and
intended to mitigate the negative effects of weight manipulation. The second proposed learning-
based control framework dealt with the problem of data falsification. Under this framework,
the honest agents attempt to estimate their neighbor’s states and consequently learn the attack
parameters for Byzantine neighbors. After learning these parameters then the honest agents
utilize this information to eradicate the negative effects of adversarial attempts and enhance the
performance and synchronization of the entire event-triggered multi-agent network system.
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